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Europol, the European 
Police Office, was created 
by the member states of 
the European Union as 
the central hub for the 
exchange and analysis of 
law enforcement infor-
mation. Its existence is 
proof that the coopera-
tion between member 
states in creating a single area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice has reached a new multilateral 
level.
Working in close cooperation with the member 
states, Europol is in a unique position to provide 
an overview of the security situation in the 
European Union. Two annual public awareness 
reports are produced by Europol: the EU Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) and the Terrorism 
Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT). Both have 
become important awareness tools for decision 
makers at European level.
The TE-SAT is a forward-looking document. Its aim 
is not only to describe the situation in the 
European Union regarding terrorism and related 
phenomena, but also to identify trends. For the 
first time since the adoption of a new methodolo-
gy in 2006, TE-SAT 2008 offers the possibility to 
compare the findings of one year with those of 
the previous year. 
As an annual product, the TE-SAT is still in its infan-
cy. Nevertheless, awareness in the member states 
about the importance of such a tool is growing. It is 
my pleasure to note that contributions for TE-SAT 
2008 have increased significantly in quantity and 
quality. I would like to thank the member states 
and Eurojust for their continuing commitment and 
cooperation.
Terrorism manifests itself in a variety of ways and 
has been an issue in the EU for many years. The 
impact of terrorist attacks became obvious again in 
2007 with the murder of two Spanish police officers 
in France by the Basque separatist terrorist group 
ETA. Our thoughts are with their families.
The overall threat to the member states from ter-
rorism remains serious, as demonstrated by the 
failed attacks in London and Glasgow and the dis-
rupted plots in Germany and Denmark. The tran-
snational nature of this threat requires an EU-wide 
response. In order to effectively meet the chal-
lenge of counter-terrorism in the EU, the member 
states must continue to develop robust coopera-
tion and coordination networks to facilitate infor-
mation exchange and to assist in our understand-
ing of the challenges that face us.
I would like to take this opportunity to express my 
gratitude to the Portuguese and Slovenian 
Presidencies as well as to Eurojust and SitCen for 
their support and valuable contribution to the 
project throughout the year.
Max-Peter Ratzel 
Director of Europol
1. fOREwORD by ThE DIRECTOR
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2. INTRODUCTION
The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-
SAT) was established in the aftermath of the 11 
September 2001 attacks in the United States as a 
reporting mechanism from the EU Council’s 
Terrorism Working Party (TWP) to the European 
Parliament. The first five editions of the TE-SAT 
were presented by the respective Presidencies of 
the EU Council, “based on a file and on the analy-
ses supplied by Europol” from member states’ 
contributions.1
At the beginning of 2006, Europol proposed to 
widen the data collection for the TE-SAT in order 
to enhance the quality of the report. The proposal 
was endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council on 1 and 2 June 2006, and TE-SAT 2007 
was based on a new methodology developed by 
Europol in consultation with the advisory board of 
2006, consisting of the Finnish and German 
Presidencies, Eurojust and SitCen (the EU Joint 
Situation Centre).2
For TE-SAT 2008, the scope of the report has been 
slightly modified regarding the qualitative data, 
allowing the member states to report on criminal 
acts committed by extremists. This change has 
been made in consultation with the advisory 
board of TE-SAT 2008, consisting of the Portuguese 
and Slovenian Presidencies, Eurojust and SitCen.
In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the 
TE-SAT is an unclassified annual document which 
provides information on the phenomenon of ter-
rorism in the EU. The TE-SAT discusses terrorism 
from a law enforcement point of view, i.e. as a 
“crime”, although terrorism is fundamentally a 
political phenomenon driven by political motives 
and oriented toward political ends.
The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes 
and analyses the outward manifestations of ter-
rorism, i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It neither 
attempts to analyse the root causes of terrorism 
nor to assess the threat posed by terrorism. 
Furthermore, the TE-SAT does not assess the 
impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism poli-
cies and law enforcement measures taken, despite 
the fact that they form an important part of the 
phenomenon.
The TE-SAT is an EU report and, as such, aims at 
providing an overview of the situation in the EU 
rather that describing the situation in individual 
member states. It seeks to establish basic facts 
and figures regarding terrorist attacks, arrests and 
activities in the EU.
The TE-SAT is also a trend report. Since a trend can 
be defined as a general tendency in the way a sit-
uation is changing or developing, the TE-SAT is a 
forward-looking report. As TE-SAT 2007 was the 
first report based on the new methodology, no 
comparison with previous years was possible. 
Consequently, TE-SAT 2008 is the first edition that 
attempts an analysis of trends.
The TE-SAT is based mainly on information con-
tributed by the member states concerning and 
resulting from criminal investigations into terror-
ist offences. The TE-SAT does not contain informa-
tion which is classified or which could jeopardise 
ongoing investigations.
1  ENFOPOL 41 REV 2 (8466/2/01).
2 SitCen monitors and assesses events and situations worldwide with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism 
and WMD proliferation.
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3. TE-SAT 2008 METhODOlOgy
3.1. Definitions
Terrorism
Terrorism is not an ideology or movement, but a 
tactic or a method for attaining political goals. 
This view is also reflected in the Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism 
(2002/475/JHA).3 All member states had to align 
their national legislation with this Framework 
Decision by 31 December 2002. At the end of 
November 2007, the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator reported to the European Council 
that, apart from Slovakia, all member states had 
fully completed the implementation. In Slovakia, 
the Framework Decision was partially implement-
ed with the exception of the provisions concern-
ing the liability of legal persons.4
An overview of the legislation on terrorism, or cur-
rent proposals of legislation, regarding the ten 
countries which provided information on court 
cases to Eurojust is described in Annex 3.
Whereas the member states have harmonised 
their national legislation with the provisions of 
the Framework Decision, the definition of terrorist 
acts provided in Article 1 of the Decision includes 
elements, such as the impact of the act concerned, 
which are open to interpretation. For practical 
reasons, the data collected for TE-SAT 2008 
relies on the member states’ definitions of ter-
rorist offences.
TE-SAT 2007 restricted its reporting purely to ter-
rorism, disregarding extremism. The disparities 
currently existing between the member states 
with regard to the crime areas which are defined 
as terrorism or extremism, respectively, were 
reflected in the contributions to the report. As a 
result, the European scope of the crime areas 
could not be fully described. For TE-SAT 2007 this 
was especially true for left-wing and right-wing 
terrorism. For TE-SAT 2008, this problem would 
also have affected the reporting on the new cate-
gory of single issue terrorism.
TE-SAT 2008 continues to focus on terrorism. 
Although not all forms of extremism sanction the 
use of violence, extremism as a phenomenon may 
be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behav-
ioural patterns. Criminal acts committed by 
extremists, with the potential to seriously 
destabilise or destroy the fundamental politi-
cal, constitutional, economic or social struc-
tures of a country will consequently be included 
in TE-SAT 2008 if reported by the member states.
In TE-SAT 2008, this methodological modification 
only applies to the qualitative part. With regard 
to the quantitative part, the member states 
were again asked to provide data on arrests, 
attacks and activities defined as terrorism at 
national level.
The member states have been asked to contribute 
data on all individuals arrested for terrorism 
offences in the course of 2007. “Arrests” refers to 
judicial arrests warranted by a prosecutor or 
investigating judge, whereby a person is 
detained for questioning on suspicion of com-
mitting a criminal offence for which detention 
is permitted by national law. That the person 
3 An outline of this Council Decision is included in the Annex 2.
4 An amendment of the Criminal Code is in preparation in Slovakia and will comprise specific provisions on this aspect.
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may subsequently be provisionally released or 
placed under house arrest does not impact on the 
calculation of the number of arrests.
Attacks have been reported by member states 
as failed, foiled or successfully executed. The cat-
egory “reported activities” relates to terrorist activi-
ties investigated as such in the member states.
Types of Terrorism
Terrorist organisations in the TE-SAT are catego-
rised by their source of motivation. However this is 
not always an easy task, as many groups have a 
mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually 
one ideology or motivation dominates. The choice 
of categories used in the TE-SAT is pragmatic and 
reflects the current situation in the EU. The catego-
ries are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Islamist terrorism is motivated either in whole or 
in part by an abusive interpretation of Islam; the 
use of violence is regarded by its practitioners as a 
divine duty or sacramental act.5
Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups, 
such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL) and Real Irish 
Republican Army (RIRA), seek international recogni-
tion and political self-determination. They are moti-
vated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion.
Left-wing terrorist groups, such as the Revolu-
tionary People’s Liberation Army (DHKP-C), seek to 
change the entire political, social and economic sys-
tem of a state according to an extremist leftist 
model. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. The 
agenda of anarchist terrorist groups, such as the 
Unofficial Anarchist Federation (Federazione 
Anarchica Informale, FAI), is usually revolutionary, 
anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian. Not all mem-
ber states have distinguished between activities of 
left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups in their con-
tributions. For this reason, both categories are dis-
cussed in the same chapter of this report.
Right-wing terrorist groups seek to change the 
entire political, social and economic system on an 
extremist rightist model. The ideological roots of 
European right-wing terrorism can usually be 
traced back to National Socialism.6
Singe Issue Terrorism is violence committed with 
the desire to change a specific policy or practice 
within a target society. The term is generally used 
to describe animal rights and environmentalist 
terrorist groups.7
3.2. TE-SAT 2008 Data
The data collection for TE-SAT 2008 covered ter-
rorist attacks, activities and arrests in the EU in 
2007 and terrorist attacks outside the EU in which 
EU interests were affected. In addition, Eurojust 
collected data on prosecutions and convictions 
for terrorist offences in member states.
Both quantitative and qualitative data on terrorist 
attacks and activities was collected from the mem-
ber states. Terrorism is not mass or collective vio-
lence but rather the work of small groups, howev-
er popular these groups may be. Even if supported 
by a larger organisation, the number of militants 
who engage in terrorism is usually very limited.8 
However, some aspects of the phenomenon, such 
as attacks and arrested suspects, can also be ana-
lysed with the use of quantitative research meth-
ods. Due to the relatively small number of investi-
gations into terrorist activities reported by the 
member states, terrorist activities are analysed 
and described mainly with the help of qualitative 
data, although quantitative data was also collect-
ed to support the analytical work.
Europol extracted quantitative TE-SAT data on ter-
rorist attacks and activities as well as on arrested 
suspects from reports on terrorist incidents con-
tributed by the member states. The processed 
data was cross-checked and, in case of gaps, com-
plemented by open source data systematically 
monitored, collected and processed by Europol. 
5 Compare to Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, pp. 83 and 89-97.
6 Their American counterparts, white supremacist groups, are often categorised as religious terrorists. See Hoffman, 
Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, p. 237.
7 See Wilkinson, Paul (2001) Terrorism versus democracy, first edition, p 20.
8 Crenshaw, Martha (2003) “Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts”, in Terrorism in Context, ed. 
Crenshaw, Martha (2003), pp. 3-26, esp. p. 4.
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After this, Europol requested the member states 
to validate their national data.
Eurojust collected data on the basis of the Council 
Decision of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of 
information and cooperation concerning terrorist 
offences (2005/671/JHA), according to which the 
member states are obliged to collect all relevant 
information concerning prosecutions and convic-
tions for terrorist offences and send it to Eurojust.
According to the 2005 Council Decision, the infor-
mation submitted to Eurojust is in relation to final 
convictions. If convictions in 2007 were appealed 
but came to a conclusion before the end of the 
year, Eurojust counted the proceedings as one.
Ten member states provided Eurojust with infor-
mation on cases in their national courts: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. The UK was 
not able to provide a comprehensive overview for 
2007 within the timeframe set, but most high-
level cases were included. Although some data is 
still lacking, the member states most affected by 
terrorist offences provided their contribution. In 
general, the contributions to Eurojust were of bet-
ter quality compared to 2006 with a much higher 
level of detail.9 Due to differences in the data con-
tributed to Eurojust for 2006 and 2007, however, it 
was not always possible to compare the findings.
The aforementioned Council Decision 2005/671/
JHA also obliges the member states to collect all 
relevant information concerning and resulting 
from criminal investigations conducted by their 
law enforcement authorities with respect to ter-
rorist offences and sets out the conditions under 
which this information should be sent to Europol. 
This information facilitates Europol’s data collec-
tion for the TE-SAT only to a limited extent, as the 
TE-SAT does not contain information that may 
jeopardise ongoing investigations.
The data contributed by the member states to TE-
SAT 2008 was generally of high quality with a high 
level of details. In addition to the quantitative con-
tribution, all member states also provided Europol 
with a qualitative contribution.
The collected data for 2007 referred to a total of 
583 attacks, 1044 arrested suspects and 331 con-
victions for terrorism charges in the EU. It should 
be noted that the arrests and convictions may 
be related to terrorist offences that took place 
before 2007 and, consequently, may not be 
related to activities and attacks reported for 
the purpose of TE-SAT 2008.
Although the member states’ reporting on terror-
ist attacks, activities and arrests continues to vary 
in degree of elaboration, it can generally be stated 
that the data contributed by the member states 
for 2007 was more detailed than that for 2006. 
Concerning TE-SAT 2008, the main information 
gap is found in the number of fatalities and casu-
alties in terrorist attacks. Regarding Islamist terror-
ism, reporting on group affiliation was generally 
missing. In a few cases, the type of terrorism was 
not specified. In the statistics, such cases were 
registered under the category “other”.
Gaps in the data collected by Europol may be due 
to the fact that the investigations into the terrorist 
attacks or activities concerned are still ongoing. In 
addition, it is a well known fact that terrorist activ-
ities are not always prosecuted as terrorist offenc-
es. Furthermore, it seems likely that terrorist 
attacks and activities with perceived low and/or 
local impact remained underreported to Europol. 
It is not possible to track these investigations by 
monitoring open sources and include them in the 
data, as generally only the most “spectacular” 
cases, in particular as regards terrorist activities, 
are reported in the media.
As was the case for TE-SAT 2007, the UK was not 
able to provide Europol with comprehensive 
quantitative data for TE-SAT 2008. Nevertheless, 
two failed Islamist terrorist attacks in 2007 were 
contributed. As for the TE-SAT 2007, UK authori-
ties contributed the total number of persons 
arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 without 
any affiliation. The UK did, however, contribute a 
comprehensive qualitative report. TE-SAT 2008 
describes and analyses the situation in the UK 
mainly based on this contribution.
Information on and analysis of Islamist activities 
on the Internet is the result of a project initiated at 
Europol in October 2004 within the framework of 
the second EU counter-terrorism task force and 
later transferred to Europol’s counter-terrorism 
unit. The description and analysis of the situation 
outside the EU, both for separatist and Islamist 
terrorism, is mainly based on open sources.
9 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Eurojust.
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4. OvERvIEw Of ThE  
SITUATION IN ThE EU 2007
4.1. Terrorist Attacks
In 2007, nine member states reported a total of 
583 failed, foiled or successfully executed attacks. 
This is a 24 percent increase from what was 
reported in 2006. Of the 583 attacks, 517 were 
claimed or attributed to separatist terrorist groups 
in Spain and France. The vast majority of these 
attacks were arson attacks aimed at causing mate-
rial damage. Although the number of casualties 
and fatalities is limited, two persons were killed in 
an attack claimed by the Basque separatist terror-
ist group ETA.
With regard to Islamist terrorism, two failed and 
two attempted attacks were reported for 2007. As 
in 2006, failed or attempted Islamist terrorist 
attacks took place in the UK, Denmark and 
Germany. Police investigations into the attempted 
attacks in Denmark and Germany have shown 
that the intended targets were likely to be located 
on their national territory. The failed and attempt-
ed attacks mainly aimed at causing indiscriminate 
mass casualties.
Member 
state Islamist Separatist Left Wing Right Wing Single Issue
Not 
Specified Total 2007
Austria 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
France 0 253 0 0 0 14 267
Germany 1 15 4 0 0 0 20
Greece 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
Italy 0 0 6 0 0 3 9
Portugal 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Spain 0 264 8 0 0 7 279
UK 2 – – – – – 2
Total 4 532 21 1 1 24 583
Figure 2: Number of failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks in 2007 per member state and affiliation
2006
2007
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Attacks Arrests
N
um
be
r
Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled and successfully 
executed attacks and number of arrests 
2007 compared to 2006
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Left-wing and anarchist groups were responsible 
for 21 attacks in the EU during 2007. The most 
affected countries were Italy followed by Spain. 
The vast majority of the attacks were successfully 
executed and aimed at governmental institutions 
or private businesses.
The majority of attacks related to right-wing 
organisations are contributed as extremism. One 
right-wing terrorist attack was reported for 2007, 
in Portugal.
Single issue terrorism was introduced as a new 
category for 2007. Although a number of inci-
dents were attributed or claimed by animal rights 
and environmentalist extremist groups, only one 
was contributed as a terrorist attack.
A complete list of all contributed attack and arrest 
data for 2006 and 2007 can be found in Annex 4 
and 5. 
Member state Islamist Separatist Left Wing Right Wing Single Issue Total 2007
Austria 5 0 0 3 0 8
Belgium 9 1 0 0 0 10
Bulgaria 4 0 0 0 0 4
Cyprus 2 0 0 0 0 2
Denmark 9 0 0 0 0 9
France 91 315 3 0 0 409
Germany 3 8 4 0 0 15
Ireland 0 24 0 0 0 24
Italy 21 0 23 0 0 44
Portugal 1 0 0 31 0 32
Romania 1 2 0 0 0 3
Slovakia 1 1 0 0 0 2
Spain 48 196 17 0 0 261
Sweden 2 0 0 0 0 2
the Netherlands 4 1 1 10 0 16
UK – – – – – 203
Total 201 548 48 44 0 1044
Figure 3: Number of arrested suspects in 2007 per member state and affiliation
4.2. Arrested Suspects
A total of 1044 individuals were arrested for ter-
rorism-related offences in 2007. This is an increase 
of 48 percent compared to 2006. France, Spain 
and the UK have reported the largest number of 
arrests per member state.
The number of arrested suspects for separatist ter-
rorism has more than doubled in comparison to 
2006. This increase is mainly due to the vast 
increase in the number of arrests in France and 
Spain. In 2007, Spain saw a seven-fold increase in 
arrested suspects: from 28 in 2006 to 196 in 2007. 
France went from 188 people arrested in 2006 to 
315 in 2007, an increase of almost 68 percent.
Concerning Islamist terrorism, the number of arrest-
ed individuals decreased compared to 2006. In 
2007, 201 persons were arrested for Islamist terror-
ism, compared to 257 in 2006. This decrease can 
mainly be attributed to a 35 percent decrease in the 
number of arrested suspects reported by France. 
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However, the UK reported a 30 percent increase in 
arrested suspects. Although no affiliation could be 
assigned, UK authorities estimate that, out of the 
203 persons arrested in 2007, the vast majority 
were in relation to Islamist terrorism.
At the time of their arrest, all suspects were 
between 17 to 72 years of age. The average age 
was 35 years, with two thirds of the arrested being 
between 23 and 43 years old. Persons arrested for 
anarchist and right-wing terrorism offences were 
generally younger than 30.
The vast majority of the arrested suspects were EU 
citizens. A large number of these were separatist 
terrorists arrested in France and Spain. 
Furthermore, an increasing number of the arrest-
ed suspects have the citizenship of the country of 
arrest. 
As in 2006, the vast majority of suspects were 
arrested for membership of a terrorist organisa-
tion. Twenty-two percent were arrested for attack-
related crimes such as planning, preparing or exe-
cuting an attack. As in 2006, financing, facilitation 
and recruitment continue to be activities of which 
the arrested are suspected. The number of sus-
pects arrested for propaganda has increased. The 
suspects arrested for this offence are mainly linked 
to Islamist terrorism.
The number of women arrested for terrorism 
offences is still relatively low.10 In 2007, ten per-
cent of all arrested suspects were women. There is, 
however, a noticeable difference between the dif-
ferent types of terrorism, ranging from seven per-
cent women among Islamist terrorists to fourteen 
percent among separatist terrorist groups. Eighty 
percent of all women arrested for terrorism were 
EU citizens.
4.3. Convictions and 
Penalties
In the course of 2007, 418 individuals were tried 
on terrorism charges in the member states, in a 
total of 143 proceedings. No consistent informa-
tion was available regarding the time that had 
elapsed between arrests, trial and date of convic-
tion but, in general, it can be stated that the con-
victions relate to events which occurred before 
2007.
Of the 418 individuals, 34 were women. The vast 
majority of these were charged in relation to sepa-
ratist terrorism.
NEU
22%
Unknown
9%
EU
69%
Figure 4: Citizenship of arrested suspects in 2007
10 In the 2007 statistical data, the gender of only 8.5 percent of the arrested remained unknown, compared to 17 
percent in 2006.
11 The total number of 419 individuals tried (instead of 418) is caused by the fact that one individual was tried in 
both Italy and Spain.
Member state 2006 2007
Belgium 24 5
Denmark 0 11
France 21 54
Germany 16 7
Greece 0 17
Ireland 0 6
Italy 0 47
Spain 154 231
Sweden 3 0
the Netherlands 20 8
UK 3 33
Total 241 419
Figure 5: Number of individuals tried for terrorism 
charges per member state11
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The large difference in the number of individuals 
tried for terrorism charges in 2006 and 2007 can 
partly be explained by underreporting from the 
member states in 2006. Only eight member states 
contributed data in 2006, as opposed to ten mem-
ber states in 2007.
Also noteworthy is the fact that trials with large 
groups of defendants took place in several coun-
tries in 2007. This was the case in Spain where 52 
individuals were indicted in one trial. The trial con-
cerning the 2004 Madrid bombings involved 29 
defendants. In Italy, a court case involving 14 indi-
viduals came to its conclusion in December. In 
France, there were two cases against 16 and 11 
individuals respectively, whilst all 17 individuals 
reported by Greece were tried in the same case.
Of a total of 143 court proceedings in 2007, 54 
percent were related to separatist terrorism, whilst 
38 percent were related to Islamist terrorism. Only 
one trial in 2007 concerned right-wing terrorism. 
This trial confirmed the sentence imposed on an 
individual previously convicted of the bombing of 
the Bologna railway in 1980.
The court proceedings resulted in 449 verdicts. The 
number of verdicts does not correlate directly to 
the number of suspects tried for terrorism charges 
as some suspects received more than one sentence 
in separate court proceedings. This applies in par-
ticular to Spain where 231 suspects received a total 
of 255 verdicts. These verdicts were mainly related 
to Basque separatist terrorism.
All verdicts reported by Belgium, Germany and 
the UK were related to Islamist terrorism. In Italy, 
this was the case for 44 of 47 reported verdicts.
Of the total of 449 verdicts in 2007, 331 were con-
victions. Eight of the thirty-four women tried for 
terrorism charges were acquitted. The percentage 
of acquittals increased from 15 percent in 2006 to 
26 percent in 2007. This increase may be explained 
by law enforcement authorities working to dis-
rupt terrorist plots at an early stage in order to 
avoid casualties or destruction of infrastructure 
and properties. Individuals planning attacks and 
promoting terrorist crimes may have been brought 
before court before they were able to reach the 
stage of carrying out a successful terrorist attack. 
It is generally more difficult to produce evidence 
in court for intent, propaganda and planning than 
for the execution of attacks. See figure 7.
Court proceedings in relation to Islamist terrorism 
have the highest acquittal rate: 31 percent of the 
defendants were found not guilty. Left-wing and 
separatist terrorism both have an acquittal rate of 
approximately 20 percent.
The Council of Europe has adopted a convention 
on the prevention of terrorism. Such an instru-
ment is lacking at the EU level, and national legis-
lations are still being developed in this regard. An 
overview of the current state of legislation in the 
EU member states which had court cases in 2007 
is provided in Annex 3.
Figure 6: Number of verdicts for terrorism charges in 2007 per member state and affiliation
Member state Islamist Separatist Left Wing Right Wing Not Specified Total
Belgium 5 0 0 0 0 5
Denmark 9 0 0 0 7 16
France 31 24 0 0 0 55
Germany 7 0 0 0 0 7
Greece 0 0 17 0 0 17
Ireland 0 6 0 0 0 6
Italy 44 0 2 1 0 47
Spain 61 184 8 0 2 255
the Netherlands 8 0 0 0 0 8
UK 33 0 0 0 0 33
Total 198 214 27 1 9 449
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Several interesting investigations and prosecution 
cases came to a conclusion in 2007. On 31 October 
2007, the sentences in the trial against the sus-
pected perpetrators of the 11 March 2004 attacks 
in Madrid were pronounced. The Spanish high 
court, the Audiencia Nacional, convicted three 
main defendants on charges of mass murder with 
a terrorist intent and other charges. In total, 21 
persons were found guilty of participating in the 
Madrid bombings. For one of the convicted indi-
viduals, the sentences imposed added up to 
42,952 years. However, the maximum time to be 
served in prison in Spain is 40 years.
The year 2007 also saw the conviction of four per-
sons in relation to the failed bomb attacks on the 
London transport system on 21 July 2005. The 
four individuals were sentenced to life imprison-
ment which in the UK means 40 years. The UK also 
had its first conviction in relation to terrorism 
propaganda. The three men convicted had been 
found in possession of materials suggesting that 
they were involved in the production of terrorist 
propaganda. The suspects were also in possession 
of information on how to cause explosions or 
build bombs. On trial, the defendants admitted to 
having urged British Muslims to wage violent 
jihad12 against all non-believers. They were sen-
tenced to six, eight and twelve years’ imprison-
ment, respectively.
In November 2007, the Danish high court convict-
ed three persons for planning a terrorist attack in 
Denmark. The investigation showed that the men 
procured fertiliser and chemicals which could be 
used for producing peroxide-based primary explo-
sives. Members of the group gathered large 
amounts of information on the Internet regarding 
the manufacturing of explosives and bombs. Two 
of the accused were sentenced to 11 years’ impris-
onment, while the third received a four-year sen-
tence. The prosecution subsequently appealed 
the sentences to the Danish supreme court in 
order to get the sentences increased.
In Belgium, a network of intermediaries for al-
Qaeda was successfully prosecuted in 2007. The 
prosecutors made use of a judicial decision in 
Italy: in 2007, the Italian supreme court held that 
the impact of individual terrorist actions needs to 
be seen in the wider criminal plan of a terrorist 
organisation. Sentences in Italy amounted to nine 
and six years; in Belgium, the five individuals were 
sentenced to up to ten years in early 2008.
Figure 8 provides an overview of the average penal-
ty per convicted individual in the ten member 
states. In 2006 and 2007, several convictions in 
Spain resulted in long cumulative sentences. For the 
purpose of this overview, Eurojust counted 40 years 
for all sentences exceeding this period of time.
Figure 7: Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per member state in 2007
Member state Convicted Acquitted Total Verdicts Acquitted %
Belgium 5 0 5 0
Denmark 5 11 16 69
France 52 3 55 5
Germany 7 0 7 0
Greece 13 4 17 24
Ireland 4 2 6 33
Italy 28 19 47 40
Spain 181 74 255 29
the Netherlands 3 5 8 63
UK 33 0 33 0
Total 331 120 449 26
12 Throughout the report referred to as the use of violence or violent struggle, allegedly in defence of Islam.
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The large difference in average penalty between 
2006 and 2007 is mainly due to the fact that the 
number of contributing member states has 
increased. Another factor is that a number of very 
serious cases were successfully concluded in the 
UK. Although this prevents a general comparison, 
it is still possible to compare the mean average for 
2006 and 2007.
As in 2006, the relatively high average for Spain 
can be explained by the fact that a majority of the 
defendants were convicted of murder or of “collat-
eral” fatalities. In average, membership of a terror-
ist organisation, taken as an offence in its own 
right, has resulted in sentences amounting to five 
to ten years. The average sentence in Spain has 
gone down slightly from 2006 to 2007.
In the UK, of the 33 convicted individuals, twelve 
received a full 40 year sentence. These included 
the four individuals connected to the failed July 
2005 London transport bombing. Thus, the aver-
age sentence imposed in the UK has increased 
compared to the year 2006.
The relatively low sentences in the Netherlands 
may be due to the fact that individuals suspected 
of planning attacks and promoting terrorist crimes 
were brought before the court before reaching 
the stage of successfully executing a terrorist 
attack.
In Greece, very high sentences were passed for 
one group of individuals jointly tried for different 
crimes. Almost all individuals were convicted of 
criminal association, in addition to causing explo-
sions, attempted murder, robberies and carrying 
weapons. One individual received 17 lifetime sen-
tences and another 11. All these sentences have 
been recalculated to count as 25 years which, 
according to Greek law, is the maximum term to 
be spent in prison.
Figure 8: Average penalty per convicted individual per member state in 2007 
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4.4. Key findings
The member states reported a total of 583 •	
attacks and 1044 arrested suspects in the EU.
Eighty-eight percent of all reported terrorist •	
attacks are separatist terrorist attacks target-
ing France and Spain. The attacks were claimed 
by, or attributed to, Basque and Corsican sepa-
ratist terrorism.
Arson attack was the most common type of •	
attack perpetrated by terrorists in the EU.
The majority of all suspects were arrested •	
for membership of a terrorist organisation. 
Twenty-two percent of all suspects were 
arrested for attack related offences.
The average age of arrested suspects was 35 •	
years with two thirds of all arrested between 
23 and 43 years old. The vast majority of all 
arrested were EU citizens.
The number of women arrested for terrorism •	
offences is generally low. The highest number 
of female arrested suspects was reported in 
relation to separatist terrorism.
Most attacks and arrests related to the catego-•	
ries left-wing, right-wing and single issue are 
contributed by the member states as 
extremism.
Fifty-four percent of all court cases in 2007 •	
were related to separatist terrorism, followed 
by thirty-eight percent in relation to Islamist 
terrorism.
Court proceedings in relation to Islamist ter-•	
rorism had an acquittal rate of 31 percent 
compared to 20 percent for left-wing and sep-
aratist terrorism.
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The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain reported that 
the general threat of an attack by Islamist terrorists 
on their territory increased during 2007. In France 
and Italy, the threat remains high.13 The UK has esti-
mated the risk of an attack as highly likely.14
In addition, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal con-
sider that the increasing activities of al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) aiming at internation-
al targets have an impact on the threat level in 
their member state. Italian authorities also esti-
mate that, due to their geographical proximity to 
the Maghreb, they face the risk of terrorists linked 
to AQIM attempting to enter the EU via Italy. 
5.1. Terrorist Attacks
In 2007, Europe saw four failed and attempted 
Islamist terrorist attacks. The UK experienced two 
failed terrorist attacks, while Denmark and Germany 
both reported one attempted attack each.
failed attacks – the UK
On 29 June, two car bombs failed to explode in 
central London. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
were found in the cars, one of which was parked 
outside a popular night club, while the second was 
stationed just a short distance away. The IEDs con-
sisted of gas cylinders, containers filled with petrol 
and an initiation system. Bags of nails had been 
placed on the gas cylinders and on the vehicle 
floors in order to increase the number of casualties. 
The UK police believe that a number of attempts 
were made to detonate the IEDs whilst the night-
club was still open. Approximately 1,700 people 
were on the premises at the time.
The day after the vehicles were found, a burning 
car loaded with gas cylinders was driven into the 
Arrivals Terminal at Glasgow International airport. 
The gas cylinders failed to explode; a limited 
number of people sustained minor injuries in this 
failed attack. The two male perpetrators were 
arrested at the scene. One of the men later died in 
hospital from severe burn injuries, which he 
 suffered after throwing around petrol inside the 
burning car.
5. ISlAMIST TERRORISM
Figure 9: Number of failed, foiled and successfully 
executed attacks and number of arrested 
suspects for Islamist terrorism in member 
states in 2007
13 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France, Spain.
14 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
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It quickly emerged that the attacks in London and 
Glasgow were linked. Three men were arrested 
and charged in relation to these attacks. One of 
the men was charged with withholding informa-
tion about a terrorist offence. The other two are 
accused of conspiracy to cause explosions.15 The 
trial is expected to start in October 2008.
Attempted attack – germany
Three men — a 28-year-old Turkish national and 
two German nationals aged 22 and 28 — were 
arrested on 4 September 2007, suspected of plan-
ning several coordinated bomb attacks in Germany 
with the aim to cause mass casualties. At the time 
of their arrest, the three men were in the process 
of making highly powerful explosives using hydro-
gen peroxide and military detonators. Although 
the targets had not yet been definitively selected, 
the investigation revealed that possible targets 
included US military facilities in Germany. Had the 
suspects succeeded in building the bombs, they 
would have had a higher explosive effect than the 
bombs used in the 2004 attacks in Madrid16, 
where 191 people were killed and 1,841 injured.17
The suspects had acquired the know-how to build 
the bombs mainly through specialised explosives 
training courses in training camps in Pakistan, run 
by the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). Instructions for 
building similar bombs are also available on the 
Internet. The IJU, which originates from Uzbekistan, 
was founded in March 2002 by former members 
of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). It is 
believed to have close links to al-Qaeda.
On 11 September 2007, the IJU posted a claim in 
Turkish on a Turkish jihadist Internet site in which 
they referred to the arrested suspects as members 
of the IJU. They also claimed responsibility for the 
attempted attack in Germany, naming the US Air 
Base at Ramstein and the US and Uzbek consu-
lates-general in Germany as the intended targets. 
According to the message, the aim of the attack 
was to force the closure of the German Air Base at 
Termez in Uzbekistan.18
Attempted attack – Denmark
In the so-called Glasvej case, on 4 September 
2007, the Danish police arrested eight people on 
suspicion of planning an attack in Denmark. The 
arrested individuals were between 19 to 29 years 
of age. Two of the arrested—a Pakistani-born 
Danish citizen and an Afghan citizen living in 
Denmark—are expected to be charged with plan-
ning the attack.
The Pakistani-born main suspect is alleged to 
have gone through training in Pakistan. After his 
return to Denmark, he manufactured and tested 
tricycloacetone triperoxide (TATP). He also made 
extensive use of the Internet for various opera-
tional purposes. The police investigation revealed 
links between the suspects and people abroad. 
The trial is expected to start in summer 2008.
On 11 November 2007, police arrested an addi-
tional person in connection with the case. The 
individual is suspected of planning to kidnap 
Danish citizens abroad. Allegedly, the plan was to 
pressurise the Danish authorities into releasing 
the suspects arrested in the Glasvej case.19
5.2. Arrested Suspects
For 2007, the member states reported a total of 
201 suspects arrested for Islamist terrorist offenc-
es. In 2006, the number of arrested suspects 
reported was 257. This decrease can mainly be 
explained by a 34 percent decrease in arrests in 
France. Despite the small number of failed and 
attempted terrorist attacks reported for 2007, 25 
percent of all suspects were arrested for offences 
relating to Islamist terrorism. The number of mem-
ber states which reported arrests increased from 
nine in 2006 to fourteen in 2007.
The majority of the arrests took place in France, 
Italy and Spain. As in 2006, the majority of those 
arrested came from North African countries, such 
as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. France, however, 
also reported a high number of arrests of French 
nationals. In Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium and 
Germany, the  majority of those arrested had the 
15 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
16 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.
17 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Eurojust.
18 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.
19 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark.
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citizenship of the country of arrest. This may indi-
cate an increase in the number of home-grown 
terrorists. 
As in 2006, the vast majority of the arrested sus-
pects in the UK were in relation to Islamist 
 terrorism. However, since these arrests were not 
 reported as affiliated to any type of terrorism, they 
were not included in the statistics. For 2007, the 
arrests in the UK increased by 30 percent. 
As in 2006, the arrested suspects originating from 
North Africa were often loosely affiliated with 
North African terrorist groups, such as the 
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) and al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
The percentage of women among all arrested sus-
pects remains low. In 2007 fifteen women were 
arrested for Islamist terrorist offences. This repre-
sents seven percent of the total number of those 
arrested for Islamist terrorism. As in 2006, no 
women were arrested for planning, preparing or 
executing an attack. Furthermore, no women 
were reported arrested for recruitment or training. 
Three women were arrested for an offence related 
to propaganda.
The statistics of offences reported for 2007 include 
propaganda as a new category for Islamist terror-
ism. Six percent of the arrested were accused of 
offences related to the production and spreading 
of propaganda. At the same time, the UK had its 
first convictions in relation to the spreading of 
propaganda on the Internet. In July 2007, three 
men were found guilty of using the Internet to 
incite murder. The men had distributed films of 
beheadings and published bomb-making instruc-
tions as part of al-Qaeda’s propaganda 
campaign.20
Figure 10: Percentage of arrested suspects for Islamist terrorism per offence in 2006 and 2007
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20 “Trio fuelled al-Qaeda propaganda”, BBC News, 4 July 2007.
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As in 2006, almost half of the suspects arrested in 
2007-- 45 percent--were arrested for membership 
of a terrorist organisation. Another 13 percent were 
arrested for attack-related offences, such as plan-
ning, preparing and/or executing an attack. These 
arrests took place in Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
The average age of the arrested suspects was 33 
years. Two thirds of the arrested were between 23 
and 43 years old. The pattern described in TE-SAT 
2007 regarding the correlation between age and 
type of offence continues to be observed in the 
data for 2007: arrested suspects aged between 31 
and 40 were linked to financing of terrorism and 
handling of false documents to a greater extent 
than those under 30. Activities such as recruit-
ment and facilitation, on the other hand, were 
more frequently linked to arrested suspects aged 
between 17 and 30. All suspects arrested in rela-
tion to the publication and spreading of propa-
ganda were younger that 31.
The vast majority of suspects arrested for an 
offence relating to an attack were between 26 and 
30. By contrast, suspects arrested for offences 
related to training were mainly found in the age 
category 41 to 50.
The arrests in relation to financing of Islamist ter-
rorism decreased slightly compared to 2006. In 
2007, France arrested six people suspected of pro-
viding financial support to AQIM. In Denmark, two 
members of the al-Aqsa Association in Denmark 
were charged with financing of terrorism. The sus-
pects were accused of sending money to the mili-
tary branch of Hamas. Both suspects were acquit-
ted in the city court. The case has been appealed 
to the high court.21
The number of suspects arrested for recruitment 
increased in 2007. Twenty-nine individuals were 
arrested in four member states: Belgium, Rumania, 
Spain and Sweden. The majority of those arrested 
were suspected of recruitment for jihad in Iraq. 
One of the suspects was arrested for recruitment 
on behalf of AQIM.
In December, the French security services arrested 
one Algerian and one French national suspected 
of shipping material—binoculars, maps, tele-
phones, portable computers, radios and navigat-
ing systems—to AQIM. The filming equipment 
was intended to be used for filming future attacks. 
One of the suspects planned to join the organisa-
tion on location in Algeria.22
In May 2007, a French citizen of Algerian descent 
was arrested after contacting AQIM via the 
Internet. He had identified potential American 
and French military, political and civilian targets in 
France and Luxembourg, and made reconnais-
sance videos. A number of bomb-making compo-
nents were found in his possession.23
5.3. Terrorist Activities
Radicalisation and Recruitment
The member states continue to report on EU 
nationals and residents who are being recruited 
for jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, Iraq 
attracted the largest number of recruits from EU 
member states. In Belgium, an investigation into 
the recruitment of suicide bombers for Iraq 
revealed a network of intermediaries for al-Qaeda 
spread across Europe and the Middle East. The 
investigation started in 2005 after a Belgian 
woman became the first European female suicide 
bomber in Iraq.
Routes and logistics to smuggle recruits from 
France, Spain and Italy to Iraq continue to be 
dominated by North African Islamists.24 North 
African cells in Europe were also found to be 
recruiting young EU nationals for training in North 
or West Africa. In June 2007, three Moroccans 
were arrested in Spain attempting to transfer 
recruits to training camps in the Sahel region.25
Dutch authorities reported an increasing number 
of Dutch nationals and residents willing to 
 participate in jihad outside the EU. In the 
Netherlands as well as in France, the country’s 
military  participation in Afghanistan—but also 
21 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France, Denmark.
22 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
23 “Nancy: le djihadiste avait décidé de passer à l’action”, Le Figaro, 14 October 2007.
24 “Spanish police arrest 6 suspected jihad recruiters”, Associated Press, 28 May 2007.
25 “Spain arrests three al Qaeda suspects in Barcelona”, Reuters, 26 June 2007.
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in Lebanon—is a motivating factor for the 
jihadists.26
In France, police and intelligence services found 
increasing evidence that Somalia is becoming a 
new alternative destination for people willing to 
fight jihad.27 In early 2007, UK authorities estimat-
ed that British passport holders fighting with the 
Islamists in Somalia were “in their dozens”.28 There 
are also indications that terrorist training and 
planning of attacks—with a focus on the UK—is 
taking place in Somalia.29
In the past few years, a number of terrorist groups 
have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and its lead-
ers. Two groups have been confirmed as part of 
the organisation by its leadership: al-Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia in Iraq in September 2004 (now part 
of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq) and the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria 
in September 2006 (now al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb). In addition, former leading personali-
ties of the Egyptian Islamic Group and the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group have, in 2006 and 2007 
respectively, committed themselves to the ideals 
of al-Qaeda. However, the relationship between 
these groups and networks and the al-Qaeda 
leadership is characterised by different levels of 
autonomy, sophistication and motivation. 
Nevertheless, this expansion of the “al-Qaeda fran-
chise” has the potential to constitute a threat to 
the EU’s security. It could provide al-Qaeda with 
access to new centres of support which it can 
motivate and exploit.30
Over the last five years, much of the command, 
control and inspiration for planning attacks came 
from al-Qaeda’s remaining core leadership in the 
tribal areas of Pakistan. In the UK, the plans often 
included the use of young, radicalised British citi-
zens to mount the actual attacks.31 The foiled 
attacks in Germany and Denmark in 2007 demon-
strated that contacts between networks in the EU 
and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the Pakistan-
Afghanistan region are not a problem for the UK 
alone.32
The UK reported a significant and increasing 
number of suspects that are under investigation 
on suspicion of Islamist terrorism. At the time of 
the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, approx. 
250 Islamists were under investigation on charges 
of terrorism in the UK. Since then, there has been 
a major increase in numbers: from 500 people 
under investigation in July 2004, the figure 
reached 1,600 by the end of 2006.33 In November 
2007, the British Security Service was looking at 
no fewer than 2,000 individuals posing a direct 
threat to national security.34
Some of these individuals, both British and for-
eign, were involved in planning attacks. However, 
a still larger proportion provides support through 
financing of terrorism and making ideological and 
military training available.35
Propaganda
Terrorist propaganda aims at providing a coherent 
interpretation of the world which justifies terrorist 
activities as acts of war or self-defence. It is an 
important tool for attracting resources and recruits 
to terrorist groups and networks. 
The al-Qaeda leadership used the year 2007 for an 
unprecedented public relations campaign. In 
September 2007, Osama bin Laden appeared in a 
video tape for the first time since 2004. The video 
26 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: the Netherlands, France.
27 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
28 “Backed by British money and men”, The Times, 10 January 2007.
29 “Intelligence counter terrorism and trust”, speech by the director general of the British Security Service, 
5 November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk
30 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
31 ibid.
32 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark, Germany.
33 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
34 “Intelligence counter terrorism and trust”, speech by the director general of the British Security Service, 5 
November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk.
35 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
TE-SAT 
2008
21
5
. 
IS
lA
M
IS
T 
TE
RR
O
RI
SM
was followed by several audio messages.36 At the 
same time and throughout 2007, Ayman al-
Zawahiri continued to issue a great number of 
prepared speeches and interviews through al-
Qaeda’s media wing al-Sahab Media Production 
Company.
Since mid-2006, al-Sahab has become the exclu-
sive label of multimedia and multilingual propa-
ganda for al-Qaeda leading figures. The speeches 
published by al-Sahab are often accompanied by 
English subtitles. Where the speaker uses English, 
Arabic subtitles have been added. Al-Sahab has 
also started to use other languages such as Pashto 
and, very recently, German.
Propaganda material is also produced by support-
ers of Islamist terrorism who act on the Internet 
without necessarily being members of a particular 
terrorist group. Much of the material is published 
in several languages under the name of the Global 
Islamic Media Front (GIMF). The GIMF first appeared 
in 2002 and was initially only publishing material 
in Arabic. Today, it produces documents in various 
languages, including English, French and German. 
In 2007, the German-speaking GIMF published 
two videos, threatening Austria and Germany 
with attacks unless they pulled their troops out of 
Afghanistan.37
The recent investigation in the UK which led to the 
conviction of three men for using the Internet to 
incite murder shows how the Internet can facilitate 
the jihadists’ activities. The investigation revealed a 
large international network of people who jointly 
provided support to jihadist  movements on a glo-
bal scale without ever having met in person.38
Videos and films calling on Muslims to take part in 
the global jihad continue to play a significant role 
in the recruitment process. The ongoing conflicts 
in the Middle East and South Asia are dominant 
issues for al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in rela-
tion to propaganda. The increasingly sophisticat-
ed methods of promoting this agenda, in particu-
lar using the Internet and other electronic media, 
have been identified as factors contributing to the 
increasing number of Islamist terrorists.39
In Bulgaria, four persons were arrested for distri-
bution of Islamist terrorist propaganda on the 
Internet. Two of the arrested were female con-
verts. The four suspects had, among other things, 
translated material from Chechen sites and posted 
it onto their website.40
Law enforcement agencies in Luxembourg have 
identified a group of Islamist extremists who are 
radicalising young Muslims. Both self-produced 
videos and propaganda obtained from other 
groups are used for this purpose.41
In Denmark, a Moroccan-born Danish citizen was 
sentenced to three years and six months in prison in 
April 2007 for distributing Islamist terrorist propa-
ganda with the purpose of instigating terrorism. 
The man owned his own publishing company which 
he used for disseminating terrorism propaganda.42
In November 2007, the European Commission pre-
sented to the European Council a proposal to amend 
the 2002 Council Framework Decision on combat-
ing terrorism with a view to criminalising the use of 
the Internet to provide terrorist training.43
Training
An increasing number of EU nationals attended 
training in Pakistan and were later involved in, or 
suspected of, terrorist offences in the EU. The 
36 Guido Steinberg, “The Return of al-Qaeda”, SWP Comments 22, December 2007.
37 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Austria.
38 “UK terrorism convictions”, Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, 12 September 2007.
39 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
40 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Bulgaria
41 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Luxembourg.
42 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark.
43 “Justice and Home Affairs: Commission adopts counter-terrorism package”, Europe Information Service, 8 
November 2007; “Proposal for a Council Framework Decision amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
combating terrorism”, Communication of the European Commission (COM (2007) 650 final), 6 November 2007.
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majority of the arrested suspects in the foiled 
attacks in Germany and Denmark had received 
some form of training in Pakistan.44 The trial, in 
2007, of the perpetrators of the failed attack in 
London on 21 July 2005 revealed that they had 
received training both in Pakistan and in the UK.45
In 2007, Italian police arrested three Moroccans 
accused of providing terrorist training at a small 
mosque in central Italy. The training allegedly 
consisted of the use of arms, explosives and toxic 
substances in terrorist operations. During a house 
search, Italian counter-terrorism police found bar-
rels of chemicals and instructions on how to pilot 
a Boeing 747.46 The suspects had contacts with 
the members of the GICM arrested in Belgium in 
2005.47
logistical support
A majority of the member states continue to 
report on EU-based suspects providing logistical 
support to terrorist groups and networks based 
outside the EU. The logistical support generally 
consists of providing material, funds, and false 
identity documents. These types of terrorist activi-
ties are also frequent in member states which oth-
erwise reported a general low risk from Islamist 
terrorism.
Although for 2007 the member states reported 
fewer arrests in relation to financing of terrorism 
than for 2006, financing activities are still frequent 
within the EU. Recent terrorist cases show that 
organisations or individuals involved in financing 
of terrorism use a great variety of methods to raise 
funds. In Italy, nine people suspected of ties with 
AQIM were arrested in June.48 Allegedly, the cell’s 
high revenues mostly originated from drug deal-
ing and counterfeiting money. Other counter-ter-
rorism operations in Europe uncovered the use of 
front companies in the real estate sector, as in 
Spain,49 or the transfer of funds to aid terrorist 
organisations, as in France50 or Germany.51
Financing of terrorism does not only imply the 
transfer of money but also of material goods 
which, upon arrival at the final destination, can be 
sold and converted into money. This was noted in 
the investigation into a Moroccan network oper-
ating in southern Portugal and Spain. The network 
was involved in the theft of high value vehicles 
which were then shipped to North African coun-
tries and sold in order to fund local Islamist terror-
ist groups.52
Besides financial support, European-based terror-
ist networks provide other logistical support to 
Islamist terrorists travelling to, from or within the 
EU. In France, Islamist terrorists were found to pro-
vide logistical support to AQIM.53 Italy reported on 
logistical support in the form of providing false 
documents for terrorist operations outside Italy.
Member states, such as Finland, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, which reported a generally 
low threat from Islamist terrorism, nevertheless 
highlighted the risk that their country may be 
used as a logistical base for terrorists operating 
outside of the EU. The majority of these countries, 
together with Romania and Estonia, also reported 
on the potential risk that their countries may be 
used as transit countries by terrorists trying to 
enter other EU countries. Romania reports an 
increase in the number of individuals attempting 
to enter the country illegally from Pakistan with 
the aim of continuing to other member states. 
Pakistani individuals in Romania with links to 
44 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark, Germany.
45 “Europeans get terror training in Pakistan”, International Herald Tribune, 10 September 2007; “Pakistan to Europe: 
a pipeline of terror”, Boston Globe, 17 October 2007; “Danish intelligence said to hold pictures of terrorist suspect 
at training camp”, Politiken, 18 January 2008.
46 “Italy’s underground Islamist Network”, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 16 August 2007.
47 “Italy holds 3 on terror charges”, Associated Press, 21 July 2007.
48 “Al-Qaeda-linked cell was planning attacks in Milan”, Adnkronos International, 7 June 2007.
49 “Detenidos dos presuntos islamistas que reinían dinero para financiar atentados”, La Vanguardia, 25 July 2007.
50 “13 Kurds arrested in France over terror financing”, Agence France Presse, 5 February 2007.
51 “German prosecutors charge man founding terror group”, Associated Press, 16 May 2007.
52 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Portugal.
53 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
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Islamist extremism were involved in such activi-
ties. Lithuania reported an increasing number of 
individuals with suspected links to Islamist terror-
ism transiting the country in 2007.
5.4. Situation outside the EU
In 2007, French and Spanish and German nation-
als were killed in terrorist attacks outside the EU. 
On 2 July, eight Spanish nationals were killed in a 
terrorist attack in Yemen. Yemeni government 
officials believe that the attack was carried out by 
al-Qaeda.54 French nationals were the target of 
two separate terrorist attacks: one in Saudi Arabia 
on 26 February and one in Mauritania on 24 
December. Both attacks claimed four fatalities 
each.55 In Mauritania, local prosecutors announced 
that they believed the suspected perpetrators of 
that attack belonged to AQIM.56 In August 2007, 
three police officers working at the German 
Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, were killed in an 
attack which was claimed by the Taliban.57
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM)
In 2007, AQIM further adapted its tactics and 
propaganda to the model of al-Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia, Iraq. It committed several suicide 
attacks with high numbers of causalities. AQIM 
demonstrated the threat it poses to Europe by 
specifically targeting European citizens and inter-
national bodies in Algeria. In April 2007, AQIM 
claimed an attack which, according to its claim of 
responsibility, targeted the Interpol office in 
Algiers. French nationals in Algeria were specifi-
cally targeted and injured on 21 September when 
a vehicle convoy of a French company was 
attacked.58 Europeans were also amongst the 
fatalities and casualties of AQIM’s attack on UN 
offices in Algiers in December 2007.59
On 29 December 2007, AQIM published a state-
ment in which they criticised the Mauritanian 
government for their support of the Dakar Rally, 
referring to it as a “collaboration with the 
Crusaders”. In view of the possible threat against 
the event, the Dakar Rally 2008 was cancelled.
AQIM, which until 24 January 2007 was known as 
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), 
has received massive international publicity since 
changing its name and adopting al-Qaeda’s 
modus operandi. Whilst the Algerian government 
and France remain AQIM’s principal propaganda 
targets, 2007 saw increased AQIM media-output 
identifying all Western nations as potential tar-
gets. In 2007, direct threats were made by both 
AQIM and al-Qaeda towards the Spanish autono-
mous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. 
Both AQIM and al-Qaeda were also advocating 
attacks against US, French and Spanish interests in 
North Africa.60
So far there has been little indication that radical-
ised Islamists seek to travel from Europe to join 
AQIM as part of the wider jihad against the West. 
Nonetheless, as indicated by the 2007 arrests in 
France, there is evidence to suggest that radical-
ised individuals may offer to act on behalf of AQIM 
to attack European targets.
Pakistan/Afghanistan 
Al-Qaeda and affiliated pro-Taliban groups in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan are increasingly recog-
nised as one of the main drivers of Islamist extrem-
ism and terrorism in the EU. In 2007, terrorism 
investigations in at least three countries showed 
links to groups in this region.
The tribal areas of Pakistan host a number of ter-
rorist training camps operating in support of the 
Afghan Taliban, pro-Taliban Pakistani groups and 
foreign mujahideen. Both Germany and Denmark 
reported that several suspects in the attempted 
terrorist attacks in 2007 had received training in 
Pakistan.
54 “Muere la turista española que quedó ingresada en Yemen tras el atentado”, La Vanguardia, 2 July 2007.
55 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
56 “Two held over Mauritanian killings”, BBC News, 11 January 2008.
57 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.
58 “French open probe on Algeria attack that injured two French”, Associated Press, 25 September 2007.
59 “UN raises toll in Algeria bombing to 17 dead”, Associated Press, 14 December 2007.
60 “El ‘número dos’ de Al Qaeda incita otra vez a atacar a España”, El País, 4 November 2007.
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Afghan Taliban and pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan 
have links to the increasingly active core-structure 
of al-Qaeda that is currently based in the Pashtun 
tribal areas in western Pakistan. There it is believed 
to have reorganised and rebuilt its capabilities as 
well as its command and control functions.61
Terrorist attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan 
increased significantly in 2007, compared to 2006. 
These attacks were mainly directed at foreign 
troops in Afghanistan and government troops in 
Pakistan. In the course of 2007, Afghanistan saw 
an increase in the use of IEDs and suicide bomb-
ers. Statistics on terrorist attacks in Pakistan show 
a three-fold increase from 2006 to 2007.62
In July 2007, the frequency of attacks in Pakistan 
more than doubled and remained high through-
out the rest of the year. This shift happened virtu-
ally overnight and coincided with the storming by 
Pakistani security forces of the besieged complex 
of Lal Masjid, the Red Mosque, in the capital 
Islamabad on 11 July, during which the pro-
Taliban militants inside the complex were defeat-
ed.63 The same day, al-Qaeda issued a statement 
calling for jihad against the Pakistani government 
as a response to the siege of Lal Masjid.64 
Immediately afterwards, an unprecedented wave 
of suicide bombings struck the capital and other 
parts of the country, mainly targeting the Pakistani 
armed forces and intelligence services.65 Fighting 
escalated in the Pakistani tribal areas, especially in 
Waziristan, where Pashtun militants clashed with 
government troops as well as with Uzbek foreign 
fighters.66
Afghanistan and Pakistan in general, and the 
Pashtun areas in particular, are of utmost impor-
tance to EU counter-terrorism. In the past, terrorist 
links between Pakistan and the EU were almost 
exclusively focused on the UK. The foiled plot in 
Germany, related to an Uzbek group based in the 
Pakistani tribal areas, and recent cases in the UK 
and Denmark indicate an increasingly assertive 
and efficient Pakistani-based command and con-
trol of Islamist terrorism in the EU.
Somalia
In 2007, leaders of militant Islamists in Somalia, as 
well as the leadership of al-Qaeda, renewed the 
call for jihad against Ethiopian forces in Somalia 
and the internationally recognised Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia. In the EU, the 
former spokesman of the proscribed UK group 
al-Muhajiroun posted a statement on the Internet 
calling followers to join the jihad in Somalia.67 In 
January 2007, the US launched air strikes in the 
south of the country, targeting senior al-Qaeda 
operatives. This provoked agitation by the Islamist 
group Hizb-ut-Tahrir on the streets of London.68 In 
Greece, the far-left militant group Revolutionary 
Struggle claimed responsibility for a rocket-pro-
pelled grenade attack against the US embassy in 
Athens in response to US intervention in Somalia 
and elsewhere.69
The success of the Somali Islamists in 2006 attract-
ed some foreign fighters to join, but the new calls 
to jihad likely engaged additional volunteers from 
abroad. More than 90 suspected foreign Islamist 
61 “Intelligence counter terrorism and trust”, speech by the director general of the British Security Service, 5 
November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk.
62 Approx. 10 percent of the attacks are attributed to the non-Islamist Balochistan separatist movements. “Country 
statistics: Pakistan”, Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre.
63 Ibid.
64 “The Aggression Against Lal Masjid”, audio speech by Ayman al-Zawahiri, 11 July 2007.
65 There were a total of 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan in 2007, 36 of which targeted the military and intelligence 
services. See: Abbas, Hassan, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, Issue 2, January 2008; 
“Suicide Attacks Spread to Islamabad”, Terrorism Focus, Vol. 4, Issue 25, 31 July 2007.
66 Richards, Julian, “Terrorists in the Tribal Areas: Endgame for Musharraf?” Pakistan Security Research Unit, 22 
September 2007; “Open borders and the militant Uzbeks of Pakistan”, Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 25 January 2008.
67 “UK preacher in secret web call for jihad”, Sunday Times, 14 January 2007.
68 “Islamists use raid to stir up UK Somalis”, Sunday Telegraph, 14 January 2007.
69 “Greek militants claim US Embassy attack responsibility”, Dow Jones International News, 25 January 2007.
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insurgents were reported captured or killed  during 
2007; among them were five Swedish and five 
British nationals.70
The Islamist insurgents employ guerrilla tactics 
against military targets as well as acts of terrorism 
against civilian targets. The frequent suicide 
bombings, perpetrated by both men and women, 
are a new phenomenon in Somalia suggesting a 
foreign, al-Qaeda-driven, influence from other 
scenes of global jihad.71
Iraq
The overall security situation in Iraq improved 
during 2007. Although ethno-sectarian violence 
continues to be of concern, civilian casualties and 
attacks with IEDs decreased. The number of 
attacks with IEDs fell from 1,700 in June 2007 to 
less than 700 in December. The number of report-
ed security incidents is now down to the same 
level as in 2005. Targets of terrorist activity in Iraq 
include Iraqi civilians as well as foreigners 
employed by private businesses.
Since 2005, 14 of the 667 suicide attacks have been 
committed by women. Although the overall number 
of attacks decreased, the number of women 
involved in suicide attacks increased in 2007.72
Kidnappings of foreign nationals in Iraq continue 
to be frequent. In May 2007, five British nationals 
were kidnapped by an Iraqi group who demanded 
the withdrawal of all British armed forces from 
Iraq.73 A German national and her son were taken 
hostages in Iraq in 2007. While the woman was 
later released, her son is still missing. An Austrian 
national kidnapped in 2006 is also still missing. 
A video of this hostage was disseminated by his 
captors in January 2007.
Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, under the umbrella of 
the Islamic State of Iraq, remains a major and direct 
obstacle to peace and stability in Iraq. However, 
the terrorist organisation appears to face increas-
ing opposition across Iraq from armed groups led 
by tribal leaders. There are strong indications that 
its military capabilities and its ability to fund oper-
ations have been significantly affected.74
By the end of 2007, the majority of al-Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia’s leadership and many of its fighters 
were foreign-born. Likewise, over 90 percent of 
suicide bombers were foreign terrorists.75 As the 
security situation improves, foreign terrorists may 
leave Iraq or relocate their jihadist activities to 
other regions, including the EU.
5.5. Key findings
In 2007, the EU saw two failed and two •	
attempted attacks related to Islamist terror-
ism; 201 suspects were arrested.
The failed and attempted attacks in the mem-•	
ber states aimed at causing indiscriminate 
mass casualties by means of detonating a 
main charge composed of home-made explo-
sives. In two cases the suspects attempted to 
produce TATP.
Manuals on how to build bombs, together •	
with Islamist terrorist propaganda, are increas-
ingly spread on the Internet. In 2007, al-Qaeda 
launched an unprecedented media campaign. 
Islamist terrorist propaganda is increasingly 
available in European languages.
Al-Qaeda’s remaining core leadership in the •	
tribal areas of Pakistan is exercising command 
and control on and inspiration for planning 
70 “Four Swedes arrested in Somalia”, CNN, 20 February 2007; “Official says Western Jihadists killed in Somalia”, 
Reuters, 3 June 2007; “Secret SAS mission to Somalia uncovers British terror cells”, Daily Mail, 23 June 2007.
71 “Foreign Fighters Face Obstacles Joining the Somali Jihad”, Terrorism Focus, 24 July 2007; “Veiled Threats”, 
Washington Post, 12 August 2007.
72 “Increase in female bombers raises concern”, CBS News, 4 January 2008.
73 “Briton held in Iraq for 8 months is put on TV”, Times online, 27 February 2008.
74 “DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno from Iraq”, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 
U.S. Department of Defense, 17 January 2008.
75 “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Update”, press conference with Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, Multi-National Force-Iraq’s 
Communication Division, Baghdad, 20 January 2008.
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attacks in the EU. A number of EU-nationals 
who attended training in Pakistan were later 
involved in terrorist offences in the EU.
The member states are threatened with vio-•	
lence by Islamist terrorist groups outside and 
within the EU in an attempt to influence 
national policies in conflict areas.
Although the majority of all arrested suspects •	
for Islamist terrorism continue to be North 
African citizens, the member states reported a 
high number of arrested suspects with the 
nationality of the country of arrest.
The number of persons arrested for recruit-•	
ment increased. The majority of the suspects 
were arrested for recruiting for jihad in Iraq, 
while Somalia was reported as a new destina-
tion for jihadists.
Suspects arrested in relation to financing of •	
terrorism, handling of false documents and 
training are generally older that those arrested 
for recruitment, facilitation and the produc-
tion and spreading of propaganda.
The member states on the eastern border of •	
the EU may be used as transit countries for ter-
rorists in order to reach other parts of Europe.
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6.1. Terrorist Attacks
In 2007, 91 percent of the attacks in the EU were 
claimed by, or attributed to, separatist terrorist 
groups. A total of 532 terrorist attacks were report-
ed in three member states: France, Spain and 
Germany. Of these, 97 percent were claimed by, or 
attributed to, Basque and Corsican separatist ter-
rorist groups.
The number of casualties and fatalities caused by 
separatist terrorist attacks in Europe remains lim-
ited. However, Spanish law enforcement officials 
remain an explicit target for Basque separatist ter-
rorism. In 2007, this was further evidenced by the 
deadly attack on two Guardia Civil officers in 
France.76 The attack was claimed by ETA.
France saw a slight decrease in the number of 
attacks compared to 2006. Spain, on the other 
hand, reported a 95 percent increase. This can 
partly be explained by the end of the ceasefire 
between ETA and the Spanish government. In 
early 2007, ETA stated that, despite the attack on 
the Madrid airport on 30 December 2006, they 
still considered the unilateral ceasefire declared in 
March 2006 to be valid. However, on 6 June 2007, 
ETA publicly announced the end of the ceasefire. 
In 2007, ETA claimed responsibility for a total of 
ten attacks in Spain and one in France.
Taldes Y attacks are perpetrated in support of ETA 
activities by a network of individuals with links to 
ETA’s youth organisation SEGI. Taldes Y attacks 
decreased in frequency immediately after the 
ceasefire of March 2006. However, during the sec-
ond half of 2006, the number of attacks increased 
again and remained high throughout the report-
ing period. For 2007, the vast majority of all 
attacks reported by the member states in relation 
to Basque separatist terrorism were categorised as 
Taldes Y attacks. See figure 12.
In Spain, the vast majority of the attacks commit-
ted were arson attacks. Eighty-nine percent of all 
6. EThNO-NATIONAlIST AND 
SEPARATIST TERRORISM
Figure 11: Number of failed, foiled and successfully 
executed attacks and number of arrested 
suspects for separatist terrorism in member 
states in 2007
76 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
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attacks were reported as successfully executed. 
Basque separatist terrorists in Spain mainly attack 
governmental77 and business78 targets. Twelve 
percent of the attacks were directed at critical 
infrastructure79 and the vast majority of these 
were attributed to Taldes Y. The majority of the 
attacks in Spain were carried out in the Basque 
region.
In France, two regions were targeted by separatist 
terrorist groups: the Basque region and Corsica. In 
the Basque region, thirty-three percent of the 
separatist terrorist attacks targeted private prop-
erty80, a decrease compared to 2006. Forty-one 
percent of the attacks were directed at business 
targets.81 In Corsica, fifty-five percent of separatist 
terrorist attacks targeted private property such as 
private holiday apartments. Only sixteen percent 
were directed towards governmental interests, a 
small decrease compared to 2006. See figure 13.
In Corsica, 31 percent of the attacks carried out 
were attributed to FLNC or FLNC UDC. Two attacks 
were attributed to ARMATA CORSA 1774. The 
remaining 154 attacks either were not claimed or 
could not be attributed to a particular group.
Germany reported fifteen separatist terrorist 
attacks for 2007. Fourteen were claimed by the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL). The 
77 Governmental targets in Spain include government offices, court houses, and political parties.
78 Business targets in Spain include ATMs, bank branches, real estate agencies.
79 Critical Infrastructure in Spain includes highways and railways.
80 Private property includes holiday apartments and cars.
81 Business targets in France include real estate agencies and the tourist sector.
Figure 12: Number of Taldes Y attacks and attacks by ETA in Spain in 2006 and 2007
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remaining attack was not claimed by PKK/
KONGRA-GEL, but has been attributed to the 
organisation by German authorities. The attacks 
took place in February and March 2007. Most of 
them were arson attacks, directed at Turkish inter-
ests in Germany, such as Turkish travel agencies, 
banks and mosques in Bottrop, Dortmund and 
Hagen.
6.2. Arrested Suspects
For 2007, eight member states reported the arrest 
of a total of 548 people suspected of separatist 
terrorism offences. Fifty-seven percent of the 
arrests took place in France, followed by thirty-six 
percent in Spain. 
The total number of suspects arrested for separa-
tist terrorism in 2007 increased by over 100 per-
cent compared to 2006. This is caused by an 
increase in arrests related to both Basque and 
Corsican separatist terrorism. In Spain, sixty per-
cent of the arrested suspects were linked to ETA 
and nine percent to ETA’s youth organisation SEGI. 
France reported an increase of eight percent in 
arrests related to Basque separatist terrorism com-
pared to 2006. The majority of the arrested were 
linked to ETA. Seven percent of the arrested sus-
pects were linked to SEGI.
In France, the increase in arrested suspects linked 
to Corsican separatist terrorism can been explained 
in part by the numerous arrests carried out after 
Figure 13: Targeting of separatist terrorist groups in France and Spain in 2006 and 2007
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Yvan Colonna, a prominent figure within Corsican 
separatist terrorism, was sentenced to imprison-
ment. After Colonna’s conviction, the youth of the 
island, considering him a hero, mounted a wave of 
violent protests. Several of the protesters were 
arrested.82
Twelve percent of all suspects arrested for separa-
tist terrorism were women. For ETA the figure is 
eighteen percent, which is the single highest per-
centage for all terrorist groups in the member 
states, regardless of affiliation.
Suspects arrested for Basque separatist terrorism 
are generally younger than those arrested for 
Corsican separatist terrorism. Fifty-five percent of 
those arrested for Basque separatist terrorism in 
France and Spain were younger than 30 compared 
to only thirty-one percent under 30 for Corsican 
separatist terrorism. This may be explained by the 
fact that most reported suspects arrested relating 
to Basque separatist terrorism were linked to 
Taldes Y attacks.
In Spain, just over 70 percent of the suspects were 
arrested for membership of a terrorist organisa-
tion. This high percentage may be explained by a 
ruling of the Spanish supreme court determining 
that three or more acts of collaboration with a ter-
rorist organisation automatically are to be consid-
ered as membership of a terrorist organisation. By 
contrast, in France, the majority of suspects arrest-
ed for Corsican separatist terrorism were arrested 
for attack-related offences.
In 2007, 38 persons were reported arrested in rela-
tion to PKK/KONGRA-GEL in five member states: 
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Slovakia. The majority of all suspects were arrest-
ed for attack-related offences. The arrests caused a 
series of protests amongst the Kurdish popula-
tions in several of these countries. Although the 
majority of the protests were peaceful, in some 
instances violence erupted, mainly directed 
towards Turkish interests.83 In February, Belgian 
authorities arrested the EU leader of PKK/
KONGRA-GEL on suspicion of financing terrorism 
via drug trafficking.84
In Ireland, the number of arrested suspects went 
up from four in 2006 to twenty-four in 2007. The 
majority of the arrested suspects were members 
of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). The 
arrests were linked to an increase in criminal activ-
ity by this group in 2007. The majority of the 
arrested were charged with membership of an 
unlawful organisation.85
French law enforcement arrested a total of 25 
members of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE 
during 2007. All arrested suspects were men. The 
vast majority of the suspects were arrested on 
suspicion of financing terrorism through extor-
tion. Seventy-two percent of the arrested were Sri 
Lankan citizens.86 The LTTE has a vast global net-
work of ethnic Tamils and associates in the diaspo-
ra, with structures of fundraising, procurement 
and propaganda firmly in place.87 One of the core 
activities of the LTTE in the EU is the collection of 
funds from the Tamil diaspora on a monthly basis 
to finance military and military-related 
procurement.88
82 Contribution to the TESAT 2008: France.
83 Zwischenbericht 2007: Entwicklungen und Analysen des Extremismus in Nordrhein Westfalen, North Rhine-
Westphalia Office for the Protection of the Constitution, September 2007.
84 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Belgium.
85 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Ireland.
86 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
87 “Funding the “Final War”: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 18, 
No. 1(C), March 2006.
88 “Feeding the Tiger – How Sri Lankan insurgents fund their war”, Jane’s Intelligence review, 1 August 2007.
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6.3. Terrorist Activities
For the second half of 2007, Portugal reported an 
unusual increase in the number of ETA activities in 
Portugal. The activities seemed to be confined to 
renting vehicles that were later used in ETA opera-
tions. This may be an attempt by ETA to avoid 
detection from law enforcement agencies in 
France and Spain. Portuguese and Spanish law 
enforcement agencies responded by creating 
joint investigation teams.89
Traditionally, ETA carries out its activities in Spain, 
France and, to a lesser extent, in other EU coun-
tries. France is mainly used as an operational rear 
base from which ETA develops its logistic means. 
It is also used for housing and training ETA reserve 
activists.
In the course of 2007, Spanish authorities noted a 
decrease in the use of commercial explosives in 
ETA-related attacks. In the past, ETA mainly used a 
combination of commercial explosives and home-
made explosives (HMEs). Recent attacks, however, 
have been based mainly on HMEs.90 This change 
in tactics may be the result of increased security 
measures taken by the French authorities to pro-
tect explosive factories, depots and explosives 
transportation, which prevents ETA from getting 
access to commercial explosives.91
In summer 2007, ETA released several versions of 
a recruitment video which showed some of their 
activities. The videos were released just after ETA 
had called off the ceasefire. The aim was proba-
bly to encourage young people to join ETA. This 
method of recruitment has rarely been seen in 
the past and may indicate a new modus operan-
di for ETA.
Financing of terrorism by extortion is reported in 
relation to Corsican and Basque separatist terror-
ism as well as the LTTE. According to open sources, 
extortion is an important source of income for 
ETA. In 2007, Spanish media reported on several 
extortion campaigns directed at businessmen in 
the Basque region and Navarre.92 Fourteen of the 
arrests reported by France in relation to extortion 
were linked to Corsican separatist terrorism. The 
majority of the arrested suspects were members 
of FLNC, targeting private businesses such as real 
estate agents.93
In Ireland, law enforcement authorities witnessed 
an increase in the number of terrorism-related 
arrests in 2007 compared to 2006. This, however, 
is mainly due to an increase in criminal activity by 
INLA. Based on capability and intent, the threat 
from the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
and Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) is estimated 
to be moderate to substantial.94
The year 2007 saw great strides forward in the 
political process in Northern Ireland, including the 
restoration of full power to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly in May. An important milestone was the 
announcement by the nationalist party, Sinn Fein, 
that it would recognise and support the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and participate 
in policing bodies.95 In view of this historical deci-
sion, the dissident terrorist group RIRA vowed to 
continue attacks against Police and British forces 
until a full withdrawal of troops.96
89 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Spain, Portugal.
90 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Spain.
91 Evaluation of the Cosmetics and Explosives Directives: Final report (Explosives), submitted to DG Enterprise and 
Industry, European Commission, by the E E C (GHK, Technopolis), 21 September 2007.
92 “ETA amenaza en nuevas cartas a los empresarios con ‘tomar medidas’ si no pagan”, El Mundo, 5 August 2007.
93 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
94 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Ireland.
95 “Power-sharing begins in Northern Ireland”, International Herald Tribune, 8 May 2007.
96 “‘Attacks on police will go on in New Year’—Real IRA”, Derry Journal, 8 January 2008.
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6.4. Key findings
A total of 532 separatist terrorist attacks were •	
perpetrated and 548 suspects were arrested 
for separatist terrorism. The vast majority of 
attacks and arrests relating to separatist terror-
ism were reported by France and Spain.
The vast majority of all attacks by Basque and •	
Corsican separatist terrorists mainly aim at 
causing material damage. Spanish law enforce-
ment officials are however explicitly targeted 
by Basque separatist terrorists.
The vast majority of reported separatist terror-•	
ist attacks against critical infrastructure are 
committed by youth organisations related to 
ETA. In Spain, only a very small number of 
Basque separatist terrorist attacks are directed 
towards private interests. This is, however, one 
of the main targets for Basque and Corsican 
separatist terrorists acting in France.
Traditionally, ETA used a combination of com-•	
mercial and home-made explosives. In 2007, 
the use of commercial explosives in ETA attacks 
decreased.
Basque separatist terrorists continue to use •	
France as a logistical base. However, in 2007 
some activities were also noted in Portugal, 
indicating an attempt to escape France and 
Spanish law enforcement.
With 18 percent, ETA has the highest percent-•	
age of women arrested compared to all other 
terrorist groups in the member states.
Financing through extortion is reported for •	
Basque and Corsican separatist terrorist groups 
as well as LTTE.
In Germany, separatist terrorist attacks are •	
mainly perpetrated by Kurdish separatist terror-
ist groups. In 2007, the attacks were motivated 
by the escalation in the Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict.
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7.1. Terrorist Attacks
In 2007, left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups 
carried out 21 attacks in five member states. The 
targeted member states were Austria, Germany, 
Greece, Italy and Spain. Eighty percent of all left-
wing and anarchist terrorist attacks were success-
fully executed. There have been no reports on 
fatalities or casualties in relation to these attacks.
In TE-SAT 2007, a large number of the reported 
anarchist attacks were contributed by Greece. 
However, Greek authorities regard the vast 
 majority of these attacks as extremism rather than 
terrorism. Therefore, they are not included in the 
2007 statistics. For TE-SAT 2008, Greece reported 
two attacks as anarchist terrorism.97
Greece reported two attacks as anarchist terror-
ism: the attack on the American embassy on 12 
January and the attack on a police station in New 
Ionia on 30 April. Both attacks were reported to 
have been committed by the anarchist terrorist 
group Revolutionary Struggle.
Taking into account the difference in the number 
of attacks reported by Greece, it is still possible to 
conclude that there has been a decrease in the 
number of left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks 
compared to 2006. In both Italy and Germany, 
attacks have gone down by approx. 50 percent.
In 2007, 55 percent of all left-wing and anarchist 
terrorist attacks were arson attacks. The majority 
targeted businesses or governmental interests. 
Only one attack was directed at private property 
or individuals. See figure 15.
Attacks by GRAPO in Spain decreased compared 
to 2006. In 2007, only one attack was attributed to 
GRAPO in Spain. In 2006, Spanish authorities 
reported five attacks attributed to GRAPO and 
one claimed by the organisation. The attributed 
attack in 2007 was the kidnapping of a bank man-
ager for ransom.98
97 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Greece.
98 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Spain.
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ANARChIST TERRORISM
Figure 14: Number of failed, foiled and successfully 
executed attacks and number of arrested 
suspects for left-wing and anarchist 
terrorism in member states in 2007
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In Germany, unidentified individuals attacked rep-
resentatives of a private company which produces 
naval ships for private and military use. In 
Hamburg, high-value company cars of two man-
agers were damaged. One of the cars was set on 
fire. In addition, the attackers vandalised the 
house of one of the managers. In the past, similar 
attacks were linked to left-wing terrorism.99
Italy reported an increased threat from left-wing 
groups and individuals using the same strategies 
and ideologies as the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades). 
These groups mainly target high-ranking Italian 
businessmen and politicians. The arrests in 
February 2007 leading to the dismantlement of 
the Partito Comunista Politico-Militare (PCP-M) 
sparked a series of incidents in solidarity with the 
arrested. Italian authorities reported that these 
incidents brought together several rival groups 
adhering to different ideologies. One such exam-
ple is the Fronte Rivoluzionario per il Comunismo 
(Revolutionary Front for Communism), which sup-
ports a revolution based on armed struggle.
On 5 March 2007, the Fronte Rivoluzionario per il 
Comunismo attempted an attack in Milan.100 A 
home-made explosive device was found in front of 
an unoccupied police station. The Fronte 
Rivoluzionario per il Comunismo claimed responsi-
bility for the attempted attack, stating that it was in 
retaliation for recent arrests.101
The Partito Comunista Combatente (PCC), a smaller 
left-wing group with the same ideology as the Red 
Brigades, claimed two attacks in 2007.102 The PCC 
justifies its attacks as blows against imperialism 
within Italian economic policy and Italy’s “contri-
bution to the NATO strategy”.103
Italian authorities have also noted a revival of anar-
chist revolutionary ideologies, particularly among 
groups and individuals united under the banner of 
the Federazione Anarchica Informale (FAI).104
In Austria, on 12 March 2007, a device looking like 
a pipe bomb was found in the underground park-
ing of a bank. The pipe bomb later turned out to 
be a dummy. A message attached to the device 
demanded amnesty for members of the Red Army 
Fraction (RAF) imprisoned in Germany.105
Extremism
In the second semester of 2007, extremist anar-
chist activities in Greece mainly took the form of 
arson attacks against low-profile targets. The main 
targets were bank branches, vehicles and political 
party offices. The number of attacks, however, 
decreased significantly compared to the first 
semester of 2007. The activities appeared to be 
isolated and decentralised. The targets seemed to 
be randomly chosen. As in previous years, the 
attacks only caused material damage.106
99 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany. 
100 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy. 
101 Alvanou, M., “Left Wing Terrorist groups in European countries, a threat still alive”, ITSTIME, May 2007.
102 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
103 Alvanou, M., “Left Wing Terrorist groups in European countries, a threat still alive”, ITSTIME, May 2007.
104 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
105 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Austria.
106 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Greece.
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In Estonia, extremist left-wing groups were 
responsible for extensive vandalism and mass 
riots in relation to the relocation of a Soviet-era 
war memorial, the Bronze Soldier, in Tallinn in 
April 2007. The Estonian embassy in Moscow was 
also attacked and vandalised. Four persons were 
charged with organising the riots. The trial is 
ongoing.107
7.2. Arrested Suspects and 
Terrorist Activities
Forty-eight individuals were arrested for left-wing 
and anarchist terrorism in five member states: 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. 
Spain and Italy reported a total of twelve suspects 
arrested for anarchist terrorism. All other arrests 
were reported as left-wing.
The vast majority of the arrests were made in Italy 
and Spain. As for all other affiliations, the vast 
majority of the suspects were arrested for mem-
bership of a terrorist organisation. Twelve percent 
of the suspects were arrested for arson attacks.
Six of the arrested suspects were women. Only 
one woman was arrested for an attack-related 
offence: she was linked to anarchist terrorism and 
was involved in an arson attack. This is the only 
attack-related offence for which a female suspect 
was reported arrested, regardless of affiliation.
Extremism
In 2007, the G8 summit was held in Heiligendamm 
in Germany. G8 meetings traditionally attract large 
crowds of left-wing and anarchist activists from all 
over the world. Demonstrations against the sum-
mit occasionally turned violent.108 Both Belgium 
and Sweden reported the arrest of a number of 
their nationals during the meeting. Germany 
reported two investigations relating to left-wing 
extremist groups planning attacks against the 
summit in 2007.
In 2007, Italy observed a merger of anarchist ter-
rorist groups and single-issue extremist groups 
linked to e.g. anti-militarism, immigration, envi-
ronmentalism and social rights. This merger may 
eventually mean that single-issue groups, which 
to date have only been involved in social protest, 
will change their activities and become more 
involved in subversive activities.109
In Belgium, anarchist extremists took part in 
actions organised by animal rights extremists. In 
the course of these activities, the anarchists 
engaged in acts of vandalism. The principal left-
wing extremist group present in Belgium is the 
Secours Rouge (APAPC), which contains former 
members of the Cellules Communistes Combattantes 
(CCC). The activities of the Secours Rouge are 
mostly related to public order. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that former CCC members 
released from prison publicly declared that they 
continue to believe that armed struggle is 
necessary.110
Sweden reported on activities by extremist auton-
omous groups prepared to use violence as a 
means to achieve their political goals. Several dif-
ferent ideological currents exist within this envi-
ronment with anarchism being most prominent. 
Both men and women are active within these 
groups. The majority are under 30 years old. 
Swedish authorities have reported that activists 
belonging to these groups are willing and able to 
use incendiary bombs against symbolic targets.111
107 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Estonia.
108 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.
109 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
110 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Belgium.
111 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Sweden.
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7.3. Key findings 
For left-wing terrorism and anarchist terror-•	
ism, five member states reported 21 attacks 
and 48 arrested suspects. No casualties were 
reported. 
Attacks in Italy and Germany decreased by •	
almost 50 percent. In Spain, attacks commit-
ted by GRAPO decreased significantly with 
only one attack committed in 2007.
Although the number of attacks decreased, •	
Italy noted a general increase in the threat 
from left-wing terrorist groups inspired by the 
ideology of the Red Brigades. Italian authori-
ties also noted a revival of anarchist revolu-
tionary ideologies.
In Greece, two terrorist attacks were commit-•	
ted by the Revolutionary Struggle. Both attacks 
caused material damage. Anarchist extremists 
in Greece continue to commit arson attacks 
against low level targets, causing material 
damage. The number of anarchist extremist 
attacks decreased significantly in 2007.
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One right-wing terrorist attack was reported for 
2007. The attack took place in Portugal where 
right-wing terrorists vandalised a Jewish cemetery 
in September 2007. The attack on the cemetery 
seems to have been part of an initiation rite by 
self-proclaimed Hammerskin Friends for the pur-
pose of pleasing and impressing the leaders of the 
Portuguese branch of the Hammerskins.112
A total of 44 suspects were arrested for right-wing 
terrorism in Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
Of these, 31 were arrested in Portugal as part of 
the operation against the Portuguese section of 
the Hammerskins. Twenty-seven of the suspects 
were arrested for possession of illegal weapons, 
racial discrimination, promotion of racial hatred 
and Nazi propaganda. The Portuguese investiga-
tion also revealed a European network of sympa-
thisers communicating via the Internet.113
With one exception, all arrested suspects for right-
wing terrorism were male. The female suspect was 
arrested in the Netherlands for possession of ille-
gal firearms. The arrested were between 18 and 30 
years of age, except for two suspects who were 40 
and 42 years old. This means that, generally speak-
ing, suspects arrested for right-wing terrorism are 
relatively young.
Extremism
Reported incidents relating to right-wing extrem-
ist continued to increase in a number of member 
states. Dutch authorities report an increase in 
reports of right-wing extremism in 2007, but esti-
mate that the level of violence remains fairly 
stable.114
Poland has reported a slight increase in right-wing 
extremist activity. The groups are mainly active on 
the Internet, where they have established interna-
tional contacts. The most active right-wing group 
is Blood and Honour and its fighting unit 
Combat 18.115
In the course of 2007, Italy observed an increase in 
activity by right-wing extremists. This increase 
manifested itself mainly in acts of vandalism and 
attacks against left-wing parties and organisa-
tions. Forza Nuova is the most prominent right-
wing extremist group active in Italy.116
Swedish authorities reported an increase in vio-
lent clashes between various left-wing/anarchist 
movements and extreme right groups during 
2007. The increase in violence is thought to mainly 
be the work of the right-wing extremist groups.117
8. RIghT-wINg TERRORISM
112 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Portugal.
113 ibid.
114 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: the Netherlands.
115 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Poland.
116 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
117 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Sweden.
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In Germany, the Saxony Minister of the Interior 
banned the right-wing group Sturm 34 on the 
basis that it is in opposition to the constitutional 
order and that its objectives and activities run 
counter to criminal law. The group consists of 
approx. 40 to 50 members and 100 sympathisers. 
Members of the group stated that they consid-
ered violence as a means of reaching their objec-
tives. In June 2007, right-wing extremists in 
Germany attacked and physically assaulted five 
persons who suffered severe facial injuries.118
UK authorities reported that the number of inci-
dents involving right-wing extremists linked to 
explosives, weapons or prohibited items has 
increased in the last ten years. In 2007, the UK 
authorities reported a total of seven right-wing 
extremists arrested for a range of explosives-relat-
ed offences. During various house searches, police 
found CS gas canisters and explosive pyrotechnics 
but also training manuals, a downloaded Internet 
article on the recovery of home-made explosive 
devices and a recipe for a simple hydrogen perox-
ide/chapati flour explosive mixture.
In October 2007, UK police found a quantity of 
nail bombs during a house search into the home 
of a right-wing extremist. Documents recovered 
at the address indicate that he was planning to 
attack mosques in the area.
In the UK, a number of the arrested individuals 
could be classified as “lone-wolves”. These individu-
als share an ideological or philosophical identifica-
tion with an extremist group, but do not communi-
cate with the group they identify with. While the 
lone wolf’s actions aim to advance the group’s goal, 
the tactics and methods are conceived and direct-
ed without any outside command or direction. 
In the UK, most of the groups involved in right-
wing extremism have a relatively small member-
ship base and many individuals are members of a 
number of like-minded groups. Thus, successful 
prosecutions are likely to have a ripple effect and, 
in the short term, diminish the ability of the vari-
ous groups to engage in street demonstrations 
and protests.
Both the UK and the Netherlands reported on 
increased hostility against Muslim communities 
from right-wing extremists.119 The failed car bomb-
ings in June 2007 by Islamic extremists fuelled the 
right-wing extremists in the UK and resulted in 
protest activity. However, according to UK authori-
ties, these attacks were generally not coordinated 
by any right-wing organisation but rather the 
result of individual acts of racism and 
criminality.120
8.1. Key findings
For 2007 the member states reported one •	
right-wing terrorist attack and 48 arrested 
related to right-wing terrorism.
Suspects arrested for right-wing terrorism are •	
generally younger than arrested suspects in 
other types of terrorism.
A majority of member states reported right-•	
wing activities as extremism and not as 
terrorism.
Activities from right-wing extremist groups •	
are increasing.
In the UK, an increasing amount of right-wing •	
extremists are involved in activities linked to 
explosive devices and home-made explosives. 
A few member states reported increased hos-•	
tility towards Muslim communities from right-
wing extremists.
118 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.
119 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK and the Netherlands.
120 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
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One single issue terrorist attack was reported for 
2007. The attack took place in Portugal and was 
committed against a transgenic corn field. Over 
100 people took part in the attack; more than one 
hectare of the field was destroyed.121
Extremism
In an incident in February, environmental extrem-
ists in Bulgaria sent letters to a number of news-
papers claiming to have placed explosive devices 
in several locations throughout the ski resorts in 
Bansko. The unknown perpetrators demanded an 
end to “the destruction of the nature in the 
area”.122
Italy reported an increase in activity from environ-
mental extremist groups against governmental 
infrastructure projects. This includes vandalism 
and sabotage of critical infrastructure.123
In 2007, European animal rights extremists were 
involved in arson attacks, letter bombs, and prod-
uct contamination, as well as wide-spread acts of 
vandalism. Threats against employees, and their 
family members, of companies which are per-
ceived to be involved in the mistreatment of ani-
mals are commonplace.124 The same applies to 
academic research institutions, such as universi-
ties, scientists, university staff and students.125
In May 2007, European law enforcement arrested 
30 animal rights extremist activists in a joint oper-
ation involving law enforcement agencies in five 
EU countries. The operation was part of an investi-
gation into Europe-wide Stop Huntingdon Animal 
Cruelty (SHAC) activities, led by SHAC leaders in 
the UK. Those arrested were suspected of conspir-
acy to blackmail Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS) 
and associated companies. The blackmail consist-
ed of a concerted effort by extremists, including 
criminality against target premises and other 
modi operandi to achieve their ambition to close 
HLS. The arrests took place mainly in the UK.
SHAC was founded in 1999, with the sole aim to 
force the closure of the contract research organi-
sation HLS. SHAC targets include suppliers, cus-
tomers and financial institutions linked to HLS. In 
the EU, SHAC is currently known to have a pres-
ence in Belgium126, Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK.127
UK government officials stated that animal rights 
extremism is a serious concern and that activists 
9. SINglE ISSUE TERRORISM
121 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Portugal.
122 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Bulgaria.
123 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
124 “Resisting the Animal Avengers”, Spiegel Online, 19 November 2007; “Animal rights militants charged after police 
operation”, Financial Times, London, 4 May 2007;
125 “Resisting the Animal Avengers”, Spiegel Online, 19 November 2007; “Animal activists plant bombs at Oxford col-
lege”, Daily Telegraph, 27 February 2007.
126 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Belgium.
127 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
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could be charged under the Terrorism Act 2000, if 
appropriate.128 UK animal rights extremists are per-
ceived to hold a pivotal role in the animal rights 
scene in the EU and UK activists are frequently tak-
ing part in extremist activities throughout Europe.
In 2007, UK law enforcement recorded 229 crimi-
nal incidents relating directly to animal rights 
extremism. The pharmaceutical industry remains 
the main target. The majority of the incidents 
were recorded as criminal damage. These were 
often directed against targets that have also been 
the subject of suspicious incidents, and threaten-
ing communications in the form of letters, e-mails 
and telephone calls.
Since August 2007, in the UK there have been a 
number of serious offences connected with ani-
mal rights extremists. A series of six claims of 
product contamination targeting pharmaceutical 
companies with links to HLS also affected France, 
Spain and Austria.129
In November 2007, two improvised incendiary 
devices (IIDs) destroyed the vehicles of two Oxford 
University professors. They were targeted by ani-
mal rights extremists. An additional IID was placed 
under a third vehicle, but failed to ignite.
In January 2007, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) 
organised a tour through various cities in Italy. 
This was a campaign against chain stores believed 
to sell furs and companies accused of conducting 
animal experiments. In October 2007, ALF also 
claimed responsibility for breaking into a labora-
tory and releasing several animals, as well as for 
the criminal damage caused to the buildings.130
According to the statistics published on animal 
rights extremist websites, the member states most 
targeted by animal rights extremists, besides the 
UK, are Italy, France, Spain and Sweden. In 2007, 
Estonia was included on the websites as a target 
country. Nevertheless, this data originates from 
animal rights extremist-owned websites. 
Therefore, it may not be representative of the 
actual problem experienced by a particular mem-
ber state. In October 2007, a French ALF cell 
claimed responsibility for a fire bomb in the 
Netherlands. This type of attacks confirms that 
animal rights extremists are not limited by nation-
al boundaries.131
Making threats via the Internet is likely to be a 
method increasingly favoured by animal rights 
extremists, due to the high level of anonymity and 
reduced levels of financial requirement and per-
sonal risk.132
9.1. Key findings 
Portugal reported one single issue terrorist •	
attack linked to environmentalist terrorism. 
A majority of all member states reported sin-•	
gle issue activities as extremism and not as 
terrorism.
The UK animal rights extremists are perceived •	
to hold a pivotal role in the animal rights scene 
in the EU. UK activists frequently take part in 
extremist activities throughout the EU.
Attacks by single issue extremist groups main-•	
ly targeted private property and individuals 
linked to targeted companies.
Italy reported an increased activity of environ-•	
mental extremist groups targeting govern-
mental infrastructure projects.
128 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cn200607/cmhansrd/cm070129/text/70129w0024.htm, 9 March 2008.
129 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
130 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
131 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
132 Ibid.
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10. TRENDS
The number of terrorist attacks in the EU is 
increasing. During 2007, 583 terrorist attacks 
were committed in the EU. Of these, 91 percent 
were perpetrated by separatist terrorists. As in 
2006, the vast majority of all attacks were commit-
ted by Basque and Corsican separatist terrorists in 
Spain and France. Separatist terrorist attacks con-
tinue to mainly cause material damage. However, 
ETA continues to specifically target Spanish law 
enforcement and governmental officials. This was 
evidenced by the fatal attack on the two Spanish 
Guardia Civil officers in France in 2007.
The number of suspects arrested for terrorism 
in the EU is increasing. The number of arrested 
suspects has increased from 706 in 2006 to 1044 
in 2007. As for the increase in attacks, this can 
partly be attributed to the increased activity of 
Corsican and Basque separatist terrorism groups. 
This trend is also reflected in the statistics report-
ed by Eurojust: in 2007, 54 percent of all court 
cases were related to separatist terrorism. 
However, the general increase in arrests can also 
be explained by the 30 percent increase in arrests 
in the UK. The vast majority of these arrests were 
in relation to Islamist terrorism. 
The use of home-made explosives in terrorist 
attacks is increasing. In the vast majority of all ter-
rorist attacks carried out by means of explosive 
devices, the main charge was composed of home-
made explosives. As in 2006, this continues to be 
the main type of explosive used by Islamist terror-
ists. For 2007, however, this was also noticed in 
relation to separatist terrorism, especially in the 
case of ETA. As in 2006, investigations into attempt-
ed attacks in the member states revealed the use of 
TATP, a highly volatile explosive which requires a 
certain level of expertise in handling. This corrobo-
rates the information that several of the EU sus-
pects received training in bomb-making. 
More terrorism propaganda is being produced 
and distributed over the Internet than ever 
before. Propaganda continues to be an important 
tool for terrorists in order to attract new recruits 
and give logistical support. Manuals on how to 
build bombs, together with ideological propagan-
da, are increasingly spread on the Internet. For 
2007, propaganda is also a new offence reported 
by the member states in relation to arrested 
Islamist terrorist suspects. The unprecedented al-
Qaeda media campaign during 2007 produced 
propaganda in a number of European languages, 
indicating increasing efforts to reach non-Arabic 
speaking Europeans. Although propaganda mate-
rial is available in increasing quality and quantity, 
there is no proof that this in itself leads to increas-
ing radicalisation of the targeted audience. The 
availability of great quantities of propaganda 
material, easily accessible through the Internet, 
however, does facilitate the tasks of propagandists 
and recruiters and may lead to a general increase 
in the number of Islamist terrorists in the EU.
Islamist terrorism in the EU continues to aim at 
causing indiscriminate mass casualties. Most 
investigations into failed and foiled Islamist terror-
ist attacks in the EU in 2007 showed that Islamist 
terrorists continue to aim at causing indiscrimi-
nate mass casualties. This is not only observed in 
the choice of targets but also in the methods and 
explosives used. In the failed attack in London, 
nails added to the IED would have assured a maxi-
mum number of casualties. In the attempted 
attack in Germany, the suspects tried to build a 
bomb with a higher explosive effect than the ones 
used in the Madrid attacks in 2004, the attack 
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which has so far caused the highest number of 
causalities and fatalities in the EU.
Islamist terrorism in the EU is increasingly 
influenced by Pakistani-based al-Qaeda-affili-
ated groups and networks. In 2007, member 
states observed an increasing number of plots 
confined to a single member state but with links 
to al-Qaeda-affiliated groups based in Pakistan. In 
the past, terrorist plots linked to groups/networks 
operating in Pakistan have been almost exclusive-
ly concentrated on the UK. In 2007, investigations 
into attempted terrorist attacks indicated an 
increasing influence of this region, and even 
Pakistani-based command and control on Islamist 
terrorism in the EU. The attempted attack in 
Germany also showed the emergence of a 
Pakistani-based group with links to al-Qaeda, 
which had not previously been involved in attacks 
within the EU, able to provide logistical support to 
Islamist terrorists in member states.
The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have a 
large impact on the security environment of 
the EU. As seen in the statements posted by the 
German-speaking GIMF, member states are threat-
ened with violence in an attempt to influence 
national policies on the engagement in conflict 
areas. The recruitment of EU nationals and resi-
dents for participation in jihad in Afghanistan and 
Iraq is still significant. Iraq remained the main des-
tination for jihadists in 2007. As in 2006, reports 
suggest that Somalia is becoming a new addition-
al destination for jihadists. Member states that 
have military presence in Lebanon also note that 
Islamist terrorist groups increasingly focus on this 
aspect. This indicates that the number of theatres 
of jihad is increasing.
Youths continue to be responsible for the vast 
majority of Basque separatist terrorist attacks. 
The vast majority of attacks in relation to Basque 
separatist terrorism are Taldes Y attacks. The per-
petrators are generally linked to ETA’s youth 
organisation SEGI and are younger than arrested 
suspects relating to other forms of separatist ter-
rorism. With the exception of two attacks, all 
attacks on critical infrastructure were Taldes Y 
attacks. The two remaining attacks were claimed 
by ETA and SEGI, respectively. It is also noteworthy 
that Taldes Y attacks continued throughout the 
ceasefire. All arrests in relation to Taldes Y attacks 
were reported by Spain.
Basque separatist terrorists continue to use 
France as a logistical base. Although ETA showed 
some activity in Portugal during 2007, France con-
tinues to be the main logistical base for Basque 
separatist terrorism. There is a noticeable differ-
ence in the choice of targets attacked by Basque 
separatist terrorists in France and Spain. While 
Spain only reports a very small number of Basque 
separatist terrorist attacks directed towards pri-
vate interests, this is one of the main targets for 
Basque separatist terrorism in France. In addition, 
private interests continue to be the main target 
for Corsican separatist terrorists. As evidenced by 
the ETA attack in France in December, Spanish law 
enforcement officials are nevertheless targeted 
both in France and in Spain.
The Kurdish-Turkish conflict has an impact on 
the security situation in the EU. In Germany, 
separatist terrorist violence continues to be per-
petrated mainly by Kurdish separatist terrorist 
groups. The development in the Kurdish-Turkish 
conflict in 2007 had an impact on the security sit-
uation in the EU. This was demonstrated by the 
increasing number of attacks against Turkish inter-
ests in Germany, following the escalation in the 
conflict in 2007.
Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks in the 
EU are decreasing. Spain and Italy continue to be 
more affected by left-wing terrorism than other 
EU member states. In 2007, the number of terror-
ist attacks perpetrated by left-wing and anarchist 
terrorists decreased. The recent increase in the 
threat from left-wing groups inspired by ideolo-
gies of the Red Brigades in Italy, however, may lead 
to an increase in attacks in 2008.
Activities by right-wing terrorists and extrem-
ists in the EU are increasing. Investigations into 
right-wing extremist and terrorist activities have 
shown international contacts which indicate a 
European network of right-wing activists. A few 
member states have also reported a general 
increase in hostility towards Muslim immigrant 
communities. 
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Annex 1
Abbreviations
ALF Animal Liberation Front
APAPC Association des Parents et Amis des Prisonniers Comministes Secours Rouge 
Association of Parents and Friends of Communist Prisoners Red Aid
AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BR-PCC Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Communista Combattente  
Red Brigades for the Construction of the Fighting Communist Party
CCC Cellules Communistes Combattantes
CIRA Continuity Irish Republican Army
DHKP/C Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi  
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
Basque Fatherland and Liberty 
FAI Federazione Anarchia Informale  
Informal Anarchist Federation
FATF Financial Action Task Force 
FLNC-22 Octobre Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse du 22 Octobre 
National Front for the Liberation of Corsica of 22 October
FLNC-UDC Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse - Union des Combattants 
National Front for the Liberation of Corsica - Union of Combatants
GIMC Groupe Islamic Combattant Marocain 
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group 
GIMF Global Islamic Media Front
GRAPO Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre  
Antifascist Resistance Groups October First
GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
HME Home Made Explosives
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IID Improvised Incendiary Device 
IJU Islamic Jihad Union
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INLA Irish National Liberation Army 
IRA Irish Republican Army
JHA Justice and Home Affairs 
LDRs Light Dependent Resistors
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
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PCC Partito Comunista Combattente
PCP-M Partito Comunista Politico-Militare
PKK Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party
RAF Red Army Fraction
RIRA Real Irish Republican Army
SHAC Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
SitCen European Union Joint Situation Centre 
SLA Sri Lankan Army 
TATP Triacetone Triperoxide 
TKP/ML Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist 
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist 
TWP Terrorism Working Party of the European Council
VBIED Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device 
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Annex 2
Excerpt from the Council 
framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism
According to Article 1 of the Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism 
(2002/275/JHA), terrorist offences are intentional 
acts which, given their nature or context, may seri-
ously damage a country or an international organ-
isation where committed. 
Terrorist offences are committed with the aim of 
seriously intimidating a population, or •	
unduly compelling a Government or interna-•	
tional organisation to perform or abstain from 
performing an act, or 
seriously destabilising or destroying the fun-•	
damental political, constitutional, economic or 
social structures of a country or an interna-
tional organisation. 
Terrorist offences include 
1. attacks upon a person’s life which may cause 
death; 
2. attacks upon the physical integrity of a 
person; 
3. kidnapping or hostage taking; 
4. causing extensive destruction to a Government 
or a public facility, a transport system, an infra-
structure facility, including an information sys-
tem, a fixed platform located on the continen-
tal shelf, a public place or private property 
likely to endanger human life or result in major 
economic loss; 
5. seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of 
public or goods transport; 
6. manufacture, possession, acquisition, trans-
port, supply or use of weapons, explosives or 
of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as 
well as research into and development of bio-
logical and chemical weapons; 
7. release of dangerous substances, or causing 
fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is 
to endanger human life; 
8. interfering with or disrupting the supply of 
water, power or any other fundamental natu-
ral resource the effect of which is to endanger 
human life; 
9. threatening to commit any of the acts listed 
above. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 obliges Member States to 
take the necessary measures to ensure that direct-
ing a terrorist group, participating in its activities 
including supplying of information or material 
resources, or by funding its activities are 
punishable. 
Article 3 obliges Member States to take the neces-
sary measures to ensure that terrorist-linked 
offences include aggravated theft, extortion and 
drawing up false administrative documents with a 
view to commit certain terrorist offences. 
According to Article 4, inciting or aiding or abet-
ting offences referred to in the Framework 
Decision should also be made punishable. 
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Annex 3
Implementation of the EU Framework Decision 
on Combating Terrorism in member states 
which provided Eurojust with information on 
convictions.
belgium 
At the start of 2007, a Royal Decree entered into 
force making it easier for the financial administra-
tive authorities to freeze the assets of individuals 
involved in terrorist offences, as described in the 
19 December 2003 Act on Terrorism. A second 
new bill was published on 15 May 2007 on the 
insurance against damage caused by terrorist 
acts. This new law supports the victim of a terror-
ist act in receiving compensation. Also, a Royal 
Decree of October 2006 entered into force on 15 
June 2007, allowing a check of financial transac-
tions, in order to fight money laundering and 
financing of terrorism.
Denmark 
After the introduction of the first anti-terrorism 
package on 31 May 2002, the Danish Parliament 
passed an updated package on 2 June 2006. In 
the Criminal Code, the definition of the concept of 
terrorism has been laid down in Section 114. 
Recruitment for terrorism, as well as training, 
instruction and teaching have been criminalised 
in Sections 114c and 114d. Aiding and abetting to 
terrorism is punishable with up to 6 years in prison 
according to Section 114d. Through amendments 
to the Administration of Justice Act, investigative 
powers have now been strengthened for both the 
police and the intelligence service. The amend-
ment in 2006 also allowed a less restricted access 
to exchange of information between the Security 
Intelligence Service and the Defence Intelligence 
Service. In September 2007, a new provision of 
the Administration of Justice Act entered into 
force, allowing for the storage of Internet and tel-
ecommunications data for an one-year period.
france
Since 9 September 1986, the French law has pro-
vided for the possibility that the prosecution, 
investigation and judgement of terrorist offences 
take place in Paris. In practice, all terrorist cases 
are centralised in Paris. Since then, the French leg-
islation concerning incrimination of terrorist acts 
(including financing of terrorism) as well as rules 
governing the criminal proceeding have been 
regularly amended, most recently in January 2006. 
Terrorist acts are defined by Articles 421-1 to 422-
7 of the Penal Code. French law refers in particular 
to existing offences that are qualified as terrorist 
acts “where they are committed intentionally in 
connection with an individual or collective under-
taking the purpose of which is seriously to disturb 
public order through intimidation or terror”. The 
law also provides for the participation in a group 
or association in order to prepare any act of terror-
ism. Concerning the criminal proceedings, it 
should be noted that, since 2004, specific provi-
sions have applied to terrorist offences. They 
mainly concern surveillance, infiltration, custody, 
searches, interception of telecommunications, 
taking of audio recordings and visual images in 
specified vehicles and places, and measures to 
freeze property.
germany 
At the end of 2003, the Criminal Code was updat-
ed to implement the 2002 Council Framework 
Decision. In September 2007, new provisions in 
criminal law were proposed to extend the crimi-
nalisation of preparatory terrorist acts (falling 
under Sections 129 a and b of the Criminal Code), 
and punish with up to 10 years in prison instead of 
6 months. With these proposals, training and 
receiving of training will be criminalised. Also, the 
manufacturing or possession of weapons or fluids 
and gasses which can be used for preparing to 
commit terrorist acts will be criminalised. A fur-
ther provision will be introduced criminalising 
incitement to terrorism on the Internet and 
 penalising this crime with up to 3 years in prison.
greece 
Article 187a of the Greek Criminal Code contains 
some of the provisions implementing the Council 
Framework Decision. In this section, threats to 
commit terrorist acts are criminalised, when they 
are serious enough and cause terror. Also, the set-
ting up and membership of a structured organisa-
tion of more than three persons, acting together 
and planning to commit terrorist acts is made 
punishable with up to 10 years’ imprisonment. 
Article 187 provides that perpetration of the acts 
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mentioned in article 187a may carry up to a life 
sentence. After serving 25 years, the convicted 
person can be released from prison on the basis of 
article 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Special 
investigation techniques are allowed under article 
253a of the Criminal Procedure Code. Prosecutions 
on the basis of article 187a are brought before the 
Council of the Court of Appeal.
Ireland
Terrorist acts are prosecuted under the Offences 
Against the State Acts 1939 to 1998, in combina-
tion with the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) 
Act 2005. The Criminal Justice Act 2005 provides 
for Ireland’s compliance with the Council 
Framework Decision of 2002. The Offences Against 
the State Acts provide, amongst others, for the 
offences of membership of, providing assistance 
to, and directing un unlawful organisation. The 
Criminal Justice Act strengthens the possibilities 
to deal with international terrorism and regulates 
that groups that engage in, promote or encour-
age the commission of a terrorist activity are 
unlawful organisations under the Offences Against 
the State Acts. Terrorist offences are tried at the 
Special Criminal Court which was established 
under the Offences against the State Acts.
Italy
Terrorism is defined under Article 270 of the 
Criminal Code; the definition dates back to 1980. 
An amendment in 2001 extended the definition 
of terrorism to include violence against interna-
tional organisations and foreign States. On 31 July 
2005, a new definition and new offences (such as 
recruitment and training) were introduced reflect-
ing elements of the Council Framework Decision 
of 2002. New measures to prevent and combat 
financing of terrorism were introduced in 2007, 
according to Directive 2005/60/CE. On 29 
December, new measures concerning expulsion 
in case of terrorism were adopted.
Spain
In October 2007, the government of Spain passed 
a law in accordance with the Directive 2006/24/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 March 2006: Law 25/2007 on Electronic 
Communications. The object of the law is the reg-
ulation of the providers of public electronic com-
munications services (fixed network telephony, 
mobile telephony and Internet) concerning their 
obligations with respect to the retention of data 
while providing a service, as well as the possibility 
to make that data available to the persons in 
charge of an investigation (with the permission of 
a judicial authority). The law will apply to the traf-
fic and localisation of both legal entities and natu-
ral persons and to the related data necessary to 
identify the subscriber and registered user. It will 
not apply to the content of the electronic com-
munications or to the information consulted using 
an electronic communications network. The pro-
vider will have to keep the data for a year, with a 
possibility to extend the period to 2 years or to 
reduce it to 6 months. The companies will have 6 
months after this law has entered into force (7 
November 2007) to prepare the equipment 
required to comply with the law. 
the Netherlands
A bill allowing increased possibilities for investiga-
tion and prosecution of terrorist crimes came into 
force on 1 February 2007. The new law penalises 
the establishment of a new terrorist organisation, 
as well as participation to or leadership of a terror-
ist organisation. Conspiracy to commit terrorist 
crimes and recruitment for the Jihad is also specif-
ically criminalised. Further preventative measures 
have been introduced in the criminal procedure 
law. On the basis of a Decision on investigation of 
terrorist offences, of the same date, further execu-
tive measures may be proscribed by special legis-
lation. Finally, at the end of 2006, a new bill was 
introduced allowing witnesses protected by the 
intelligence services to testify in court, thus facili-
tating the use of intelligence materials in terror-
ism proceedings. 
United Kingdom
The UK is one of the countries where anti-terror-
ism legislation has been in place for many years. 
The Terrorism Act of 30 March 2006 put in place a 
number of new offences, including preparatory 
acts, training, encouragement to terrorism and 
dissemination of terrorist publications. In 2007, 
new proposals were put forward to change the 
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counter terrorism legislation. The main elements 
proposed in the new bill are: a possible extension 
of pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects 
beyond the current limit of 28 days; a requirement 
for convicted terrorists to provide the police with 
personal information on their release from prison 
and to notify any changes to this information; 
introduction of a foreign travel order that will ena-
ble convicted terrorists to be banned from travel-
ling overseas; changes to enable post-charge 
questioning of terrorist suspects and the drawing 
of adverse inferences from a refusal to say some-
thing that is later relied on in court; enhanced 
sentences for those convicted of terrorist related 
offences; putting the police counter terrorist DNA 
database on a sound statutory footing and mak-
ing other changes to enable the full use of DNA in 
terrorist cases.
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Annex 4: failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks in 
2006133 and 2007 per member state and affiliation.
Member State Islamist Separatist Left Wing Right Wing Single Issue
Not 
Specified 
Not 
Specified Total Total
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria – 0 – 0 – 0 – 0 0 – 0 – 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France 0 0 283 253 0 0 0 0 0 11 14 294 267
Germany 1 1 0 15 10 4 0 0 0 2 0 13 20
Greece 0 0 0 0 – 2 0 0 0 0 0 – 2
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Italy 0 0 0 0 11 6 0 0 0 0 3 11 9
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
Romania – 0 – 0 – 0 – 0 0 – 0 – 0
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 136 264 8 8 0 0 0 1 7 145 279
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
the Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK 0 2 4 – 0 – 0 – – 1 – 5 2
Total 1 4 424 532 30 21 1 1 1 16 24 472 583
133 Excluding disputed data concerning attacks in Belgium and Greece for 2006.
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Annex 5: Arrests in 2006 and 2007 per member state and 
affiliation
Member State Islamist Separatist Left Wing Right Wing Single Issue Total Total
 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2007 2006 2007
Austria 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 8
Belgium 1 9 0 1 1 0 12 0 0 14 10
Bulgaria – 4 – 0 – 0 – 0 0 – 4
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Denmark 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France 139 91 188 315 15 3 0 0 0 342 409
Germany 11 3 4 8 5 4 0 0 0 20 15
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 0 0 4 24 0 0 0 0 0 4 24
Italy 34 21 0 0 25 23 0 0 0 59 44
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0
Portugal 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 31 0 0 32
Romania – 1 – 2 – 0 – 0 0 – 3
Slovakia 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 2
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 51 48 28 196 6 17 0 0 0 85 261
Sweden 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2
the Netherlands 6 4 0 1 0 1 0 10 0 6 16
UK – – – – – – – – – 156 203
Total 257 201 226 548 52 48 15 44 0 706 1044
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